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by taeric
4353 days ago
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I'm not sure your solution solves that. If Firefox has vulnerabilities in the source right now, you do little to protect yourself by compiling on your own. Even if you can verify that you and someone else produce the same binary, they could just both be vulnerable. In fact, if you compile it yourself, unless you can verify the compile against a "known good" one, then you can't even be sure that your local toolchain hasn't been compromised. (I mean, sure, if you were a perfect auditor of your entire toolchain, then you could have some confidence here. You have to be perfect, though.) Consider, you do a compile of Firefox and it is different than the one for download. Why? As things stand now, you don't know. And that is the problem. |
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You do more to protect yourself than taking the same vulnerable source and compiling it with Mozilla's "reproducible build chain".
If the source itself is corrupt then having a verified build of malicious source is completely useless.
With Gentoo you can verify the source itself matches the "trusted" upstream source and then build it with your own trustworthy build chain.
And before you go "what if your build chain isn't trustworthy huh????" think about it a little further... if your own local build chain can't be trusted you're already screwed even before you download anything from mozilla.org, just as you'd be if you downloaded a "bit verified" binary from mozilla to run on your already-pwned local operating system.