[handsomeransoms]

(Securedrop dev here) We often suggest ideas like this to deployment operators, and others as well. For example, we encourage deployments to mirror the Tor Browser Bundle so sources don't have to go to Tor's (monitored) website to get it. We encourage them to use SSL everywhere so the "trail to the landing page" is harder to spot. We encourage the exact "hidden iframes" idea you propose here. And we encourage them to deploy on a path, not on a subdomain (because hostnames are visible even with TLS). At least WaPo is doing the last one right!

Generally, it is very difficult to convince the operators of sites like the Washington Post to do things like this, but we're working on it!

[FiloSottile]

Uuuh, hi there! Thanks for the effort you all put into making leaking safer for sources.

Other possible approach: load the landing page everywhere and show it with Javascript when the user clicks their way to it. I think it's an improvement on the iframe without drawbacks. How does it sound?

[lawl]

Hard to verify that there are no ajax shenanigans.

It's a hard problem :/

[im3w1l]

Downloading Tor from an inofficial source sounds like a recipe for trojans though... I don't think most people will have Erinn's signature to verify.

[dublinben]

It shouldn't matter where you're downloading the TBB binary, since you're going to verify the signature before trusting it, right? Surely you wouldn't just assume it was legitimate, and then install it.

[JoeAltmaier]

Business idea: signature database with web interface. So download from anywhere, and look up the signature on the database to verify its authentic.

[iainnash]

How about some simple cookie tracking an iframe that loads a random number of seconds after the page loads (like 10 - 60)? That might spam the logs randomly enough so that it couldn't be tracked. However, I think measures such as including the Securedrop page as a part of the root domain only under ssl would be the simplest solution in this case.