[scott_s]

Last week, I wrote a comment replying to someone asking, if we can't use experiments to determine which interpretation is better, what's the point? Rather than repeat myself, I'll just link to it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7940647

[acqq]

You say there: "How they lean will influence what sort of questions they investigate, how they investigate it, and what sort of outcomes they will look for."

If I understand you, we can expect that somebody is maybe going to be the first to discover something new thanks to the way he's used to think about the subject. Still, before that happens, what do we have?

Edit: Only real hard science. The discoverer we expect of course must decide from which side to attack the matter to reach the new discoveries.

[scott_s]

I don't know, but I'm not sure what you're asking. Kuhn's point (and mine, by transitivity) is that scientists are human with unavoidable biases, and these biases will influence what work they do.

The reason I don't know how to answer your question is that I interpret it to mean: what tangible result do we have before we have our first tangible result?

Of course, if that's not what you mean, then please clarify. You may want to read his book, though, as this concept is central to some of it. If you're saying, "what is the effect of such paradigms before they change," then it's best to read his book. One point he makes is that everyone operates under a paradigm, whether conscious of it or not. That is, we must think about our scientific work in some way, and whatever way we think about it will influence what scientific work we do. It is generally the case, though, that many people have some form of agreement on that "some way." When we do, that sets informal bounds on what is "acceptable science."

He does use quantum mechanics as an example, but that's loaded because we're still hashing it out. Another example he uses is phlogiston chemistry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phlogiston_theory), which has thoroughly been supplanted. Those who first encountered oxygen were unable to recognize what it was because the paradigm in which they operated didn't contain the concept.

[acqq]

Thanks Scott. I understand that phlogiston thrived until real honest scientific experiments disproved it. Thanks to which "interpretation" before that point? Can't we call it "shut up, experiment and calculate"? Or, simpler, "do the science."

[scott_s]

There was none, that I'm aware of. It was a long, drawn out affair over more than a century, as far as I know. If you're looking for a direct analog to the situation with interpreting quantum mechanics, then I'm afraid you won't find it.

The analogy I draw from it is not direct, but merely: scientists unavoidably think of their work in certain ways that are themselves not tested. This thinking influences their work.

(You've made some changes since I responded, so let me respond to your last question: No, they cannot. Just as choosing what articles goes into the newspaper makes the news inherently subjective, scientists themselves choose what problems to work on, and experiments to carry out. You want them to just "do the science," but what science? The mental framework that helps them decide what science to do is what Kuhn calls a paradigm, and my claim is that the interpretations of quantum mechanics are such a paradigm. That, then, means that the interpretations are important, even if we can't yet directly test them.)

[acqq]

Just by looking at the Wikipedia entry, it appears that Kuhn's book is more philosophical than the carefully researched history of science. How do you see it?

[scott_s]

Mostly philosophical. It's given me ways to think about how science is done in practice.