[gjm11]

What Dan Pink describes is that for non-mechanical work, extrinsic motivation is ineffective in improving performance: how quickly or accurately or insightfully or imaginatively one accomplishes a particular task.

But the question with CEO pay is a bit different, and I don't think the studies Pink refers to say anything about it: what can you do to encourage CEOs to act in the best interests of the companies they manage?

This isn't a matter of, e.g., whether they notice opportunities to attack a previously unaddressed market -- which is the kind of thing for which Pink finds extrinsic motivation isn't good at improving. It's a matter of whether, having noticed such an opportunity, they further notice that taking it would be good for the company but bad for them personally because, e.g., it would have short-term costs that would drive down the value of the shares they were hoping to sell next year to buy a new house.

In which case, the findings Pink describes might actually be good news: the prospect of personal gain may be ineffective in making unscrupulous CEOs good at spotting opportunities to screw their company over to make a quick buck.