| It is both possible and, really, with just a little
inspection, really easy, just a wave of a hand, to
see how to do much better at investing in
information technology than described in the OP.
Below I outline how. The crucial supporting
background is just rock solid, so far essentially
missed by VC but among the most solid in all of
civilization -- no joke. That VC is missing out is
just absurd. The OP is yet another effort at 'understanding'
venture capital investing. There's something
strange here: At http://avc.com/2013/02/venture-capital-returns/#disqus_threa... that is, VC Fred Wilson's blog, is some data that
shows that on average in the US, information
technology venture capital returns in one word suck,
that is, are really poor, bad, low, etc. So, in trying to understand how venture capital
investing works, at least on average we are trying
to understand something that works poorly. Below I explain how to do much better, but broadly
that VCs struggle so much, as is clear in the OP, is
from incongruous to absurd. The OP is awash in some really bad news that shows
that the VCs admit that, really, they don't much
know what the heck they are doing and, instead, are
reading tea leaves and then shooting in the dark;
such nonsense is unnecessary. Let's consider some quotes from the OP: "even the top VCs write off half their deals." Dumb. Each year a VC gets 3000 deals, looks
carefully at maybe 200, invests in maybe 20, and 10
flop. Clearly something's seriously wrong here. "And of course, you make all your money on
successful and non-consensus." That the good deals should be so difficult to
evaluate that there should be no "consensus" is
absurd. Sure, detecting the next SnapChat is
difficult, but largely we should set aside such
deals -- based on, what, starting a fad of teenage
girls having fun being 'improper'. Instead it is
possible to have plenty of deals that are fairly
easy to evaluate. "And let me translate ‘non-consensus’: in sort of
practical terms, it translates to crazy. You are
investing in things that look like they are just
nuts.” E.g., another SnapChat is that way, and that's why a
VC should not take seriously such deals. E.g.,
someone comes out with a better version of the same
basic idea, but maybe SnapChat is hurt by their
installed base that becomes dragging a big anchor to
responding. But there are much better deals than SnapChat where
nothing looks "crazy" or "nuts". Putting up with
deals that are crazy or nuts is, well, crazy and
nuts. “The entire art of venture capital in our view is
the big breakthrough for ideas. The nature of the
big idea is that they are not that predictable.” Yes, “The entire art ... is the big breakthrough for
ideas"; the problem is that, flatly, VC (1) is
working with "ideas", e.g., SnapChat, that are based
on fads, etc. and, thus, are essentially impossible
to evaluate and (2) VC doesn't understand what
really good, "big breakthrough ... ideas" are, where
to find them, and how to evaluate them. For the
good, big breakthrough ideas, accurate evaluation is
quite doable, and there is little that is' not
"predictable”. VC doesn't understand (1) and (2),
and I explain below. “Most of the big breakthrough technologies/companies
seem crazy at first: PCs, the internet, Bitcoin,
Airbnb, Uber, 140 characters.. It has to be a
radical product. It has to be something where, when
people look at it, at first they say, ‘I don’t get
it, I don’t understand it. I think it’s too weird, I
think it’s too unusual.’” “Most of the big breakthrough technologies/companies
seem crazy at first" is only true because VC has
been, to borrow from a movie, "digging in the wrong
place". “You want to have as much ‘prepared mind’ as you
possibly can. And learn as much as you can about as
many things, as much as you can. You want to enter
as close as you can to a zen-like blank slate of
perfect humility at the beginning of the meeting
saying ‘teach me’…. We try really hard to be
educated by the best entrepreneurs.” Sorry, I have a serious background in how to
"learn", and my experience is that VCs are quite
poor at it and need to 'put on their game faces' and
'up their game' several notches from some very good
sources, and some popular Silicon Valley coffee or
sandwich shop is NOT such a source. “You want to tilt into the really radical ideas… but
by their nature you can’t predict what they will
be.” “There will be certain points of time when
everything collides together and reaches critical
mass around a new concept or a new thing that ends
up being hugely relevant to a high percentage of
people or businesses. But it’s really really hard
to predict those. I don’t believe anyone can.” "Really radical" is fine, maybe often necessary,
but, of course, not nearly sufficient; but it is
just crucial to have ideas that can be evaluated
accurately and to do the evaluations. For "really
really hard to predict those", VCs are "digging in
the wrong place". Instead, with good "breakthrough
ideas", "really radical", provocative, shocking,
"crazy", "nuts" that can be evaluated and that have
a good evaluation, being able to "predict" is
really, really easy. “We are looking for a magic combination of courage
and genius" Looking for "magic"? Looking for magic went out of
style back in the "Age of the Reason". Looking for
magic is wandering and shooting in the dark. As I
explain below, there is a way to find the light
switch, turn it on, and see what's happening (thank
you A. Wiles). “The thing all the venture firms have in common is
they did not invest in most of the great successful
technology companies.” There is a reason: VC has concentrated on deals,
"digging in the wrong place", that are essentially
impossible to evaluate. Instead, concentrate on
deals that can be evaluated and, then, evaluate
them. What deals are those? I explain below. "The challenge in the field is all of the great VCs
over the last 50 years, the thing that they all have
in common, is they all failed to invest in most of
the big winners." Again, the VCs were "digging in the wrong place".
Yes, even in that place sometimes there is some gold
there, but that doesn't much help because the gold
is in a form essentially impossible to recognize,
that is, evaluate. So, dig in the right place where
can recognize, evaluate, the gold that is there.
The right place? I explain below. The theme of the Andreessen remarks is wandering and
shooting in the dark. But that is unnecessary. |
(1) Problem. Pick a "big ass" problem where the first good or a much better solution will clearly be a 'must have', not merely a 'nice to have' and will be very valuable, in the sense of making money, the green kind. Note the "clearly". If pick a problem that does not satisfy "clearly", then try again. I didn't say that the success would be easy to do.
Part of the reason VC has been "digging in the wrong place" is that it tries to make money with small problems, where the solution is just 'nice to have' instead of 'must have'.
The ideal example of a 'big ass' problem, although not in information technology, would be a safe, effective, cheap one pill cure for any cancer. "Breakthrough"? Yup. "Crazy"? Sure; NIH has been throwing billions a year at that. But it would be a 'must have'; no question about 'product-market fit'. A 'must have' doesn't have any questions about 'product-market fit'. If looking at projects where the results have some doubt about 'must have' and likely need to work on 'product-market fit', then are looking at the wrong projects, are "digging in the wrong place".
Another fad for teenage girls does not qualify as a 'must have'. Yes, such a fad might make a $1 billion, but it is too difficult to evaluate. Instead, I mentioned "clearly" be a 'must have'. That is, it is crucial to be able to get a good evaluation early on, and nearly never can do that with fad products, as, indeed, the Andreessen remarks so clearly indicate.
(2) Solution. Find the needed solution. Often the solution will not be easy to find, but this need not concern VCs since they need look only at deals where a solution has already been found. If can't find the needed solution, then return to (1) and try again. A solution that is difficult to find can give a technological barrier to entry.
Q. Whatever you are working on, someone else has already done that.
A. Let's consider that: Take all the people who have done that. Then, except for rare ties, there must have been a first such person, and for them no one else had already done that. So, the claim is false. Sorry 'bout that. Instead, there really are things that are significantly and genuinely new.
Q. Then someone else can just reproduce the solution.
A. Some solutions are quite difficult to find, may be based on original work and/or advanced prerequisites understood by only a few people, implemented in software, secure inside a server farm, and, thus, provide a technological barrier to entry.
(3) Prove that really have a solution as described. When have such a proof early on, usually it is just on paper, especially for solutions in information technology. Is this possible? Yes, for nearly all of science and engineering on practical problems, it's routine and standard. It's how we build a new airplane engine, a new airplane, a new rocket, a new satellite, a new application of carbon fiber, etc.
(4) Evaluate the paper solution. Can this be done? In nearly all of applied science and engineering, such evaluations are standard and routine; it is insisted that such evaluations be done. No one puts up a new satellite with 'agile' techniques iteratively 'searching for product-market fit'. There's no counting on "magic". Fads of teenage girls are just irrelevant.
(5) Develop the solution.
(6) Deliver, sell the solution, the first good or much better "must have" solution.
Can these six steps be done? Sure; history shows that there's no doubt. Thankfully for US national security, the best examples are funded and exploited by the US DoD.
A great example was the SR-71: Problem: Get pictures of the USSR. Solution: An airplane that can fly at Mach 3+ at 80,000+ feet for 2000+ miles without refueling. Proposed essentially just on paper by Kelly Johnson and the Lockheed Skunk Works. The project passed evaluation and went ahead as planned.
Other examples: GPS and the earlier version by the US Navy -- proposed on the back of an envelop by some physicists at the JHU/APL, A seafloor, passive sonar array. The F-117 stealth plane; flew across Saddam's anti-aircraft artillery without a scratch; another Lockheed success. The Keyhole satellite, that is, a Hubble but aimed at earth.
Outside of the US DoD, the LHC; found the Higgs as planned. The WMAP satellite -- found the details in the 3 degree K background radiation as planned and got enough resolution to permit an estimate of the big bang 13.7 billion or so years ago.
These projects were evaluated essentially just on paper and worked as planned.
Generally such science and engineering has a much better batting average than VC. E.g., in each case, the SR-71, GPS, the LHC, WMAP, there was a problem that needed a 'must have' solution, such a solution, evaluation just on paper, and success. No "magic". No getting 3000 projects, looking carefully at 200, picking 20, and having 10 fail.
What should VC do? Sure: Stop "digging in the wrong place" and, instead, follow steps (1) - (6).
Will VCs get many such project proposals? Well, likely now they get more than they are willing or able to evaluate, but with interest in and success with such projects, they stand to get more such proposals. Considering how few VC projects pay off now, VCs don't need to get more than a few dozen good proposals each year. Digging in the right place doesn't require moving much dirt to get to a lot of gold.