[mpyne]

> Andreessen took the concept of "shooting the messenger" to new depths of stupidity when he said that.

And yet, not really. With the exception of RSA, American tech. companies are being hammered for the actions of NSA, not for their own "crimes". Even German companies obey German legal directives after all, and Vodafone made clear the other day the extent of government monitoring of networks around the world.

To the extent that Snowden has made clear the reality that government (and not just criminals) can take advantage of the jurisdictional problems of an open Internet, that's not the fault of the U.S. tech sector either. After all, some of the most successful NSA programs are really liaisons with European security agencies that run the actual intake work, not conspiracies with Silicon Valley.

The correct solution for Europe if they want to be free of the possibility of other nations (incl. the USA) doing targeted operations in their networks is to completely balkanize the Internet, which companies like Google and Facebook oppose for obvious reasons.

You can credit Snowden with revealing to the world the types of dangers inherent to an open Internet, but that very same set of revelations is a large part of what's harming the U.S. tech sector. You're right that people may have figured it out eventually, but nations and companies around the world tended to agree not to make too big an issue of it since the benefits of an open Internet were thought to outweigh the risks. But Snowden forced the issue.

The only true solution to the issues he raised, if you're a European citizen, cannot be left to voluntary compliance by the other nations of the world, especially since you can never certify compliance with that. You'd have to instead build out your own Facebook, your own Google, your own tech sector, just like Russia and China have done.

So credit Snowden with opening the eyes of Europe to that reality, but you can't eat your cake and have it too. We've seen region locking spread too far with just with RIAA/MPAA to want to see it infect the rest of the Internet, but that is the message Snowden is responsible for (even if it wasn't the message he meant to send).

[drumdance]

It's one thing to be dismayed at what the revelation of facts has done to the tech sector. Nonetheless, they are still facts. Calling Snowden a traitor is a red herring.

One could just as well say that Andreessen's greatest allegiance is to money. So perhaps in that context Snowden is a traitor to Andreessen's cause.

[calibraxis]

Yes, it's not that Andreessen's lost his mind; just that his role in life means he's in antagonism with people like us.

And Snowden is a traitor to the US government, whose interests are pretty much the same as wealthy elites like Andreessen (to a first approximation). But not a traitor to the world or even just the US population.

[jessaustin]

...the types of dangers inherent to an open Internet...

You haven't made the case that the NSA's shenanigans are in any way "inherent" to the internet as currently designed and implemented. I would suggest that these phenomena are due far more directly to the current organization of the USA federal government, and to the oligopoly that exists in internet service in that country. I think we ought to give Cerf, Kahn, and Postel a pass on this one.

[mpyne]

> You haven't made the case that the NSA's shenanigans are in any way "inherent" to the internet as currently designed and implemented.

Not the NSA's shenanigans, the shenanigans of any properly resourced foreign (or domestic!) intelligence service. After all, the U.S. itself suffers the same problem in reverse from China and Russia and God only knows who else.

If there's anything I've learned from hacktivists, it's that if you leave your stuff on the open Internet it will be exploited eventually, the only question is who will be exploiting it.

[jessaustin]

You're describing two different classes of threat. The threat posed by bad actors from the other side of the world is necessarily bounded: they can't take more from me than I have "online" in the first place. If I have a bank account, a secret soft-drink formula, or other assets subject to attack, what I spend on defense can be proportional to the assets themselves.

The threat posed by the bad actors affiliated with the state to which I am subject is qualitatively different. Based on intended-private information that can be construed as unlawful or even vaguely against the national interest, they can take away the rest of my life. There's nothing proportional to that.