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by worldvoyageur
4401 days ago
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Traditional shotgun clauses have edge cases that can produce bad outcomes. A better model for a shotgun clause is one in which each partner names the price they would pay for the company. The partner who names the higher price then buys the company at the price half way between the two prices. Both partners win. The buyer gets the company at a discount to what they were prepared to pay, while the seller gets a premium to what the company was worth to them. |
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To fix this, you need to have both parties commit to their prices before anyone learns anyone else's price. For example, you could require both parties to mail their offers to the company lawyer, who is only allowed to reveal them when both offers have arrived.
Of course, with the above solution, you have to trust a human being (the lawyer) to be impartial and not collude with one of the cofounders against the other. For the paranoid, you can instead use a protocol that trusts cryptography instead of humans. You could have each person choose a random nonce, publish H(price + "#" + nonce). When everybody's published a hash, everyone then reveals their price and their nonce -- you know the price was chosen without knowledge of the other party's offer. (Of course each person needs a public key to sign the hash as well, to make sure a participant can't legitimately claim "I didn't send that.")