[scotty79]

> > You can't refute an argument without data. > What if i point out that it commits a modal scope fallacy?

I tried to educate myself a bit to understand you. I've read: http://www.logicallyfallacious.com/index.php/logical-fallaci... and failed.

First example claims that "(p => q, p) so q" is a fallacy by closely squinting at word "must". Second example claims that p => q where ~q => ~p is assumed is also a fallacy because they claim that one word that q consists of spills out and covers whole statement.

From this brief brush I'd say "modal scope fallacy" is just about some fuzzily defined semantic nuance of English language. So, no, I'd say you can't refute anything except bad grammar with this.

If you can write it down and the thing you want to refute, with symbols and prove their conjunction to be tautologically false with formal logic then I'd say you've refuted the claim. But as I said that's math not philosophy.

> What data do you have to refute the statement: "A statement can be refuted without data"?

Are you asking because you think I claimed to have refuted or wanted to refute that statement?

What refutation can you offer of the statement that data is needed to refute the statement: "A statement can be refuted without data"?

That's exactly the chain of pointless self, and cross referential statements that arise when you are trying to refute something without data and/or precise definition (which would make it math).

[memla]

First example claims that "(p => q, p) so q" is a fallacy by closely squinting at word "must". Second example claims that p => q where ~q => ~p is assumed is also a fallacy because they claim that one word that q consists of spills out and covers whole statement

No it doesn't. You've formalized it incorrectly.

Doesn't matter, i might as well have said that the argument is affirming the consequent and we'd still have a problem since there is a deeper issue here. What you're saying is that the simple acts of either formalizing your arguments or precisely defining your premises somehow turns it into math and precludes it from being philosophy. Yet philosophers do exactly that all the time.

Is that the point you want to argue? Cause i am neither convinced or interested in pursuing it. It would seem to me like a pointless argument about definitions.

[scotty79]

> No it doesn't. You've formalized it incorrectly.

I haven't formalized anything, I just used notational short-hands.

Example goes:

If Debbie and TJ have two sons and two daughters, then they must have at least one son. Debbie and TJ have two sons and two daughters. Therefore, Debbie and TJ must have at least one son.

If I substitute string "Debbie and TJ have two sons and two daughters" with "p" and string "they must have at least one son" with "q" and write relation If ... then ... as ... => ... and implied conjunction between two first lines as ( ... , ... ) and substitute string "Therefore" with "so" (for no reason, I just like short syntax) I get what I wrote: (p=>q, p) so q

It's not formalization, it's just string substitution. What I implied later (mainly that the author of the example claims that something tautologically true is fallacy) assumes that we can agree to assign either true or false to the strings denoted by p and q and we use conventional logic.

The only way this could be incorrect is if words in one line of the example are defined to mean something else than exact same words in other line they occur. It's possible but without explicit definition of such bizarre behavior I won't be guessing what author had in mind.

> Doesn't matter

Oh, yes it matters. It's an excellent example of what remained of philosophy when natural philosophers left. Thinking so fuzzy that it lacks not only application but even meaning. Despite that appreciated and cited as a marvelous tool for argumentation.

> affirming the consequent

Much better. But that piece of philosophy was swallowed by math long time ago. Any statement about logic that philosophy can currently make is math, false or semantically fuzzy. You won't be trying to refute many arguments using reasoning of Zeno of Elea nowadays.

> What you're saying is that the simple acts of either formalizing your arguments or precisely defining your premises somehow turns it into math and precludes it from being philosophy. Yet philosophers do exactly that all the time.

Really? Could you point me to works of some, perhaps fairly modern, philosopher that defines what he ponders with accuracy that could be appreciated by a mathematician? But no cargo cult please. Preciseness and some actual meaning is what I'm looking for.

[memla]

Look, i originally cited that identifying (P⊃◻Q, P) ∴ ◻Q as a fallacy in an argument is an example of refuting that argument without any data. I don't care about your struggles with some random article.

As i said, i don't really want to argue weather that is math or philosophy, especially when i see statements to the effect that affirming the consequent was once philosophy but math "swallowed" it so now pointing out that fallacy means you're doing math and things like that. Talk about imprecise and meaningless right there.