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>Why not talk with me without the snark? This topic seems like it interests you a lot, so it seems like we have some shared ground. >One interesting way to detect that someone is using Tails would be to notice that their system clock is set to UTC time. Most of the computers connected to the internet aren't using UTC, so something like that is pretty commonly associated with Tails. That said, it seems like it might be difficult for the network card to detect whether the system clock is UTC time, but it's just an example of how difficult it is to fully conceal your usage of an anonymity tool. It's not just a matter of tweaking the source code. It's not out of snark (I apologize for if it sounds like it, not intentionally seeking to offend anyone), but mainly out frustration about the conversation on how everything seems to be so difficult. Difficulty to whom? Someone who cannot modify sc to a significant extent? Someone who just downloads the program and expects it to just work? Not just some random tweak, I mean going through looking at what the functions actually do, which remote connections do they rely on to connect to at various stages, how data is generated and allocated in memory, what system calls are made, etc and change it according to ones threat model so that the program one complies has the same functionality but is not recognized as the same program. Maybe that involves changing the the system time. Again, trying to target someone doing such is trying to target someone actively adapting, probably faster than it takes for the dragnet to adapt since like I said, dragnets mainly hinge on effectively going after the common denominator that of which is usually of the mind set of someone who downloads/uses a program system and expects it to just work and address all of their concerns without doing anything themselves. In the end, anyone can try all they want to cut down on the false negatives and positives, but they will still exist and that's where the "real" danger comes from for groups/orgs/gov's that go to such extents. >Once you agree that it might be possible for your network card to be your adversary, there are endless ways that it can be used to defeat you. If this is really in one's threat model, one is probably throwing away or using shared computers before this point… maybe from within a virtual machine on a large banks network from an exploit one used (remote, or local). >so why shouldn't we try to think of ways to prevent this from happening? Few people do this today for themselves, most others do not. People today seem to have come to expect that someone else needs to protect them which must have fmr cyhperpuks laughing. As far as I'm concerned, we are already living in the dystopian future, and the few who take the steps to mitigate based on their threat model do. These issues have been around for a while, and those who cared all along took steps they felt were necessary to protect themselves and still do. Maybe that involves not taking advantage of the latest skinner box of the day, again tradeoffs and threat models to consider. And those now made aware have to learn a lot to put themselves in the same shoes, if they even care enough to learn what they need to start protecting themselves and to continue to adapt to do so. Again, its not like BIOS exploits suddenly became possible because snowden profiteers told us and because all of this I don't think it really is a serious threat (any more than it already was) because your adversaries are opening themselves up at the same time. This has always been an evolving landscape. Such is the world we live in and have always had. Edit: No worries, as I've learned over time, down-voting isn't really effective for silencing ideas/discussion since it just attracts more interest to those who want to seek such information. |