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Cooperation of competitors is not necessary — that's an excuse for inaction. As with 'Safe Browsing' (or CRLSet), one browser could lead the way, letting the others follow the same model or improve later. Similarly, CA buy-in is not a blocking prerequisite for a better approach — it's just another excuse for inaction. Exactly as with CRLSet, the browser vendor can say, "we'll scrape your revocations where we can find them, or you can provide them this way". Then, if an incompetent or recalcitrant CA hides their revocations, it's an issue between the CA and their harmed customers. It's great you, me, and Adam Langley all agree that revocation is broken, including Google's stopgap proprietary solution. But hasn't everyone understood that for 15+ years? Why isn't there a fix? The browser makers absolutely own responsibility for this, because they're the ones that show end-users a security indicator. They're shipping the software that creates a risk, they can unilaterally fix this on their own initiative, and they're not so poor or stupid that fixing it should be beyond their capabilities. Yes, Google has done a lot for security. Their 'web security karma' is very net-positive. They still deserve a demerit, along with Mozilla and Microsoft, on this particular issue. Referring this to the IETF for standardization is just another way of excusing more inaction and delay. |
You can blame the browser makers as much as you want, but among them as a group, nobody has worked harder on making TLS better and safer than Google. But here you are berating them for the effort.