[tptacek]

Online revocation is pointless. It sounds like you didn't actually read the article, but are happy to slam the one team on the Internet that has given serious consideration to the obviously-broken SSL revocation system. Can I ask you to take a breath and reread the article?

[einhverfr]

> Online revocation is pointless.

So is getting a subset of revoked certs Google deems "valuable." In fact, that may be even more dangerous since it establishes first class secure sites vs everyone else.

Why should Yahoo's cert revocatins get in the CRLsets but not less well known sites? How is that less broken than online revocation?

Keep in mind, my big objection is:

Google did not distribute our certificate vocation in their CRLSet, presumably because we weren't large enough. That is not a fix for anything.

[tptacek]

This comment isn't responsive to mine.

[einhverfr]

Ok, fair enough. I am just making sure my objection to Google's approach is clear.

I would be OK if they guaranteed complete CRLsets from all participating CA's. Since they don't, their solution is more broken than what they are replacing.

So I acknowledge that online revocation is problematic. I just think the crlset approach is an order of magnitude worse when the crlset is a subset of revoked entries sent by the ca.

[tptacek]

Respectfully, I think an accurate summary of your argument is that you would rather pretend to be secure using broken online revocation checks than to have to stomach the Chromium team providing a marginal amount of actual security by deciding which sites are and aren't worthy of protection.

[gojomo]

The implied-preference-set shouldn't be restricted to the false binary choice of "the broken standardized system" and "Google's half-fixed proprietary approach".

With the talent & resources that Google has, or the talent & resources that Mozilla has, or the talent & resources that Microsoft has, this should have been better solved, in a way that works for all TLS-reliant applications, years ago.

Using Chrome's built-in auto-updates to make a subset of "high-value revocations" work, at a daily frequency, for Chrome users only, is not a very web-friendly solution.

It's like a gated community hiring its own rent-a-cops... maybe that's an improvement for the fortunate ones on the inside, and maybe a necessary stopgap. But to people outside that perimeter – like someone whose revocation doesn't make it into the Google CRLSet – it feels like an abdication of duty by the web's stewards.

[enneff]

Christ, this kind of reactionary armchair criticism really is a cancer of HN these days.

Adam has been pushing the state of the art in cryptography in the practical realm for years, and your criticism is "They should have just solved this problem better! They should just pull their finger out and get working on it."

Making a real difference in the chaotic realm of standards bodies and browser vendors is a lot harder than it looks. Adam has an impressive track record for actually improving internet security for users.

Where's your suggestion for how revocation could be solved better and implemented in a practical way? I don't see you rolling up your sleeves to get the actual work done.

[einhverfr]

If Amazon, Yahoo, and the small SaaS provider are in the same boat security-wise, then you have the incentive to get the root problems fixed. Google's approach takes away that incentive from the large providers.

I don't think it is just a question of pretending. It is a question of making sure that everyone is in the same boat security-wise so that the root problems in fact get addressed.

What Google does is make Amazon more secure and the small SaaS provider less so. And it makes sure that the big providers have less incentive to fix the underlying concerns.

[tptacek]

The Chromium team didn't choose how big to make the lifeboat. They have the one they have. If they've got to choose between putting Amazon in it or you, then, as a user, I'm glad they chose rationally.

[nomailing]

hard revocation is not at all broken! The article is bullshit.

[tptacek]

By all means, totally anonymous Hacker News one-line comment writer, tell us why Adam Langley is full of shit about certificate revocation.