[JumpCrisscross]

I understand why we have dual-class share structures. There are cases in which investors may trust management more than their fellow shareholders.

Yet I am concerned about the structures' dynastic qualities. Larry Page is a competent executive. That may not be the case in 40 years. Tom Perkins's letter to the editor comes to mind [1]. The question of what happens after Page is more troubling. Limiting control to the founders' offspring is concerning. Granted, there are valid counterexamples. Warren Buffett is as old as he is wise. And Samsung seems to be plodding along just fine despite its family's feuds.

But shareholders should have input into these issues. Perhaps the super-voting stock lapses to normal stock after its original recipient's demise. Or maybe non-voting shareholders have one right: the right to call and vote on motions of no-confidence. Such motions, if passed by a super-majority of subordinated voters, would collapse the super-voting stock to normal stock.

Aristocracy runs thick in the veins of European business. It is worrying that we may be sprouting our own contractually-annointed Silicon Valley royalty.

[1] http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230454950...

[maxerickson]

I thought the old Class B shares converted on transfer? Did the split change that, or am I misunderstanding that passing the shares to offspring would be a transfer?

[nordsieck]

... or they could just not buy Google.