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by maxtaco
4466 days ago
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Many Random Oracle crypto proofs assume a value is random and then substitute in something that's not quite so good, so I think it's a valid thought experiment. And some passwords do have 256 bits of randomness (i.e., ~15 random words from the dictionary). I think we disagree on what margin of password security we feel comfortable with. |
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Then you consider it broken when someone finds a distinguisher requiring three exabytes of output, because any distinguishable non-randomness breaks the proof.
It's trivial to make a distinguisher for user passwords. Just guess "password".
There's an inherent difference between random keys and chosen passwords. Random keys, used correctly, are secure. Passwords just give you a chance to provide your own security, and most people fail to do so. No one are picking 15 random words from a dictionary to make their passwords.
Passwords are one of the weakest links in IT security, on par with the people, and I don't think making them more of a single point of failure is the way to better security. That's what widespread 2-factor authentication was getting us away from.
Have you tried cracking uploaded keys to check the strength of the passwords?