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by bredman
4479 days ago
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Could someone explain DJB's point to me: Cryptographers are certainly not responsible for this superstitious nonsense.
Think about this for a moment: whoever wrote the /dev/random manual page seems to
simultaneously believe that
(1) we can't figure out how to deterministically expand one 256-bit /dev/random
output into an endless stream of unpredictable keys (this is what we need from
urandom), but
(2) we _can_ figure out how to use a single key to safely encrypt many messages
(this is what we need from SSL, PGP, etc.).
For a cryptographer this doesn't even pass the laugh test.
Is the argument here simply that a properly encrypted message should look like randomness? And as a result we should be able to turn something non-random into randomness? |
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