[tptacek]

If you use SSH and ignore key fingerprint warnings then yes, your use of SSH is cosmetic. Competent operators freak out when they get an unexpected key warning.

I don't understand the comparison you're trying to make between SSH and a proposal to transparently MITM a protocol that is designed to be transparently MITM'd. Unless your gripe is that we shouldn't have protocols like that to begin with, in which case I agree, but you should direct your angst to the people who proposed HTTP/2.0 OE, not this proposal.

[belorn]

I have no gripe since I do no longer consider that better-than-nothing security to be bad.

In return for using ssh over telnet, I get security against any passive attack and attacks past first login. Thus the functionality is on a technical basis superior to telnet (except if you use IPsec, then telnet is better than SSH).

A personal question: when you install a new personal laptop or server, do you check the fingerprints of every ssh connection? Do you prune the CA list and remove any entry that you personally can't vouch the trustfulness of? This is after all what SSL require of each user, so it would be interesting to know if a founder of an software security company do this to his own personal equipment.

[tptacek]

No, I copy over my SSH configuration so that I don't need to do that.

[belorn]

How can you securely copy over the configuration? This sound as a chicken and egg problem.