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by reddiric
4500 days ago
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I didn't read the linked article but I did look through the slides, which were very interesting and talked about - the abhorrent state of the engine control module code, - the RToS's design, - the critical data structures right above the stack, - that those critical data structures weren't mirrored to detect corruption as is standard and as they did for other data, - that single bit changes in that critical data structure right above a stack can cause the death of tasks in the RToS whose failsafe capabilities were located in those same tasks, and whose death was tested and confirmed to cause unintended acceleration consistent with accounts and descriptions of the event - that the failsafe monitoring CPU was not designed to detect this failure, and in fact Toyota outsourced its design and didn't even have the source code to it... |
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