[syntern]

Robert Gates put it eloquently: the US is in its own wars of choice, and not in any war that is forced upon it. So, what do you think about the secrets that would conceal the real reasons of the war that requests to be secret?

[simoncion]

bosma was asking: "Are there any things that should be kept secret during the course of war?". The obvious answer that he's fishing for is "Yes. Stuff that's critical to OPSEC.". [0]

This is a silly question to ask. AFAICT, Congress hasn't ever been briefed on the day-to-day of wartime activities. They are often lied to about our motivations for declaring war. That's obviously a very bad thing to do.

[0] The funny thing about stuff that's classified for OPSEC reasons is that it has a really short shelf life. That is to say, stuff that's sensitive OPSEC stuff can often be declassified in a matter of hours or weeks... because the actions described by the classified information have taken place and everyone knows that they took place. (e.g. information about troop movements in preparation for tomorrow's assault would be sensitive until the assault happens.)

[mpyne]

> AFAICT, Congress hasn't ever been briefed on the day-to-day of wartime activities.

But they're also not normally briefed on the high-level view of intelligence sources and methods, to ensure that those sources and methods remain available. During WWII it's not like the Navy briefed Congress that they could read much of the Japanese Navy's messages.

And even with that precaution the U.S. Navy came perilously close to tipping off Japan. A journalist embedded with Naval forces somehow gained information that the U.S. Navy had known Japan's fleet composition at Midway before the battle, and that was published in the Chicago Tribune. If Japan had been paying attention she would have realized that her ciphers were very possibly being read and taken countermeasures that would have destroyed the usefulness of that intelligence source.

To be clear, I think Congress has the right to have access to whatever information is needed to effectively oversee the NSA. But I don't see how that would imply all 535, every 2 years, being read-in to full TS and SAPs and given all details. That would make more sense for the specific subcommittee charged with overseeing intelligence, but unfortunately (for privacy advocates), that's the very same panel of people most supportive of NSA.

[harlanlewis]

> That is to say, stuff that's sensitive OPSEC stuff can often be declassified in a matter of hours or weeks... because the actions described by the classified information have taken place and everyone knows that they took place.

Minor quibble - this isn't always true.

If a hacker knows two vulnerabilities to exploit, but only exploits one of them, he keeps an advantage by keeping the extent of his intelligence a secret. If he only knows of the one that was exploited, he's not benefitted by admitting a lack of intelligence.

Apply to enemy troop positions and competitor pricing strategies as appropriate.

[simoncion]

> Minor quibble - this isn't always true.

I know. That's why I said "often can be declassified", rather than saying "always can be declassified". :)