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by itistoday2
4564 days ago
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On #bitcoin-dev, the BTC developers consider this problem to be a non-issue because they think it is easily detected simply by the number of orphaned blocks. No one on the IRC channel explained how this problem would be handled once it is detected. They refused to engage in such discussion, except to say that they wouldn't use Stephen's solution because it could introduce other problems. The current response has been an almost resounding, "We're going to stick our head in the sand and ignore it." (And then downvote you on HN for bringing it up and attempting to discuss it. :p) Edit: Here is the full, unedited transcript of what went down on #bitcoin-dev (in RTF doc format): http://jmp.sh/v/sTXe0VvyTW7pM3WgOGkT |
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Sorry, this subject matter has been discussed and debated at great length in a dozen places. No one has the time to hand-hold each and every person who learns about it and freaks out, especially if they come off as demanding and abrasive rather than inquisitive and helpful.
Saying that it is considered a non-issue would be a misrepresentation. It exists as part of a large collection of things which are potentially concerning but which are not currently problematic. Your proposed urgent deployment of "fixes" carries enormous risk and so it absolutely will not be done. So far as I've seen none of the proposed "fixes" are compromise free and many carry new, subtle, and difficult to analyze risks which may have far greater practical implications than the problem they claim to solve.
From a more practical perspective, action has been taken to improve network connectivity so that achieving alpha much greater than zero should be impossible in practice, and do the extent thats successful then there is only an issue with >33% consolidations— which are already problematic for other reasons (e.g. they can reverse six confirms with a 20% success rate).
Your specific concerns seemed to be mostly related to mining pools engaging in this activity without the consent of their hashers, this particular threat is eliminated completely by hashers that use GBT and submit blocks themselves— as you were pointed to.
In any case, in the future when you find yourself sending demands to volunteer developers asking them when they will solve your pet concern you should first ask yourself when _you_ plan on solving it.