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by umbrae
6192 days ago
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Well, as the author, I feel I better defend myself here. A: It only uses the first 20 bytes of the hash. You could narrow it down from this if you were really determined, but you'd not be able to reverse it. B: The visualization of the sparkline doesn't have the fidelity to determine between characters 6 and 7. So you'd have a range of possible characters. C: The alternative being suggested by Jakob Nielsen is no masking at all ( http://www.useit.com/alertbox/passwords.html ) - which is less secure? I know this isn't the best argument, but it still is -an- argument. With that out of the way, my paranoid mind agrees with you in this context: just masking the passwords is the more secure solution. But that doesn't mean that experiments to provide a more usable approach with (arguably) equal security should be avoided. |
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(b) The goal of the attack isn't to magically conjure the password; it's to magically conjure a searchlist of several tens of passwords, which is a game-changing improvement over a searchlist of, say, 72^8 passwords, or even tens of thousands of dictionary words.
(c) The alternative suggested by Jakob Nielson is manifestly and categorically asinine.
Good on you for a finding an application for visualizing a SHA1 hash. You score maximum points for cleverness. But now you should retire this idea.