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by superuser2
4561 days ago
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If you alter nothing when you replay the signal later, the door won't open because the "number used once" was used twice and/or the timestamp is wrong. In order to arbitrarily generate a correct unlock signal, you would need to know the phone's key so as to encrypt and sign an unlock message containing the correct date. You can't do that unless you've broken the crypto. Are you talking about moving the radio signal between the victim and the door live while he's out and about? That's clever, but the attack could be easily precluded by requiring his approval (on the phone) before sending an unlock message. Which he won't give unless he's at his front door. I see the product includes Automatic Unlock as a feature, but as long as it's optional I see no problem. Unless your threat model includes Oceans 11-style thieves and government agents, that's pretty freaking unlikely; anyone that sophisticated would probably have an easier time picking your $25 deadbolt, social engineering the landlord, breaking a window, etc. anyway. If your threat model does include these things, what are you doing buying consumer security hardware anyway? |
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And you can buy one for less than $100: http://www.sena.com/products/industrial_bluetooth/sd1000.php
So let me see, EV of robbery equals: Price of macbook + tv + jewelry, etc, etc, etc minus $100
Seems likely that you are gonna be robbed if anyone with mal-intention has any grain of understanding how easy it is to mirror an auto unlock signal...