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by paveldurov
4565 days ago
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After reading tptacek's comments in the latest thread about Telegram https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6940665 I can only agree. He insisted Telegram team should abandon its custom solution without providing any actual proof that it's vulnerable. His advice was to rely only on "modern" algorithms (mostly the ones included in "NSA Suite B Cryptography"), but he provided zero evidence why these algorithms should be more secure than the ones already in use. |
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That aside, your challenge smacks of snake oil. I gave an analogy earlier that captures the essence of the complaints:
Suppose I am selling fire-proof safes. These are designed to protect your documents and valuables from thieves and from fire and other events.
The normal way people set up tests is to put some documents and valuables in a box and actually try to break it (MythBusters style, bringing out cool machinery and trying different ways). For fire resistance, there is a rating system (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire-resistance_rating) and a standard way to test.
The Telegram proposition is: we are going to place the safe in Fort Knox. If you can't break the safe that is in Fort Knox, then clearly our safe is secure.
People are arguing that in order to break the safe, you have to break into Fort Knox. And for all intents and purposes that's not going to happen. You could have put a cardboard box in Fort Knox but no one can tell the difference because of the way you structured the challenge.
In that sense, you aren't testing the real-life security.