[Ihmahr]

I wrote the libertymail proposal. You said you'd read it but you never commented on it. It is mainly a summation of attacks that are possible on bitmessage, and provides solutions on how to prevent such attacks. I also propose a solution for scaling, one that could actually be implemented.

[Atheros]

Bitmessage's solution for scaling can be implemented.

I found your paper here: https://anonfiles.com/file/849506ebab91aa0ab90e98fc539446a2

It lacks a "summation of attacks that are possible on bitmessage" or "solutions on how to prevent such attacks."

I like that you tried to add a feature where users could choose their own anonymity/usability balance. "Users should be able to choose to remain anonymous or to disclose (partial) address information and be a ’light’ client." 200MB a day just for headers is a little bit much for a mobile 'light' client. If the protocol supports sending only headers based on a filter then why bother supporting headers? The "seeding" node could just supply a list of body messages to download that pass a filter. This would also mean that no one ever has to sync headers.

[Ihmahr]

Seriously,

To just take two examples:

-Every bitmessage user can be mitm'd by their ISP. (yes, I know about tor).

-Every bitmessage user could have only bad peers connecting to them when peers aggressively try to connect to their client.

These are two examples of attacks that work on bitmessage, that are addressed in the libertymail proposal, and for which a possible solution is given.