[YummyTempura]

There are certainly some good points covered here, and it looks like it would be better than the current status quo of extorting payments as "settlements" when one party can't afford the legal fees.

I do wonder if all these new measures will head us into a situation of patent entrenchment though, whereby patents already granted to (or subsequently acquired by) the biggest players actually increase substantially in real values due to the greater difficulty in getting new patents granted.

What I'm sure a lot of us would like to see is a better means by which to invalidate existing patents that have become standards-essential. Of course, the problem then is that you're seen as effectively punishing the most successful of ideas (in reality a lot of those patents should never have been granted in the first place).

This has become a longer response than I intended. Hopefully someone eminently more knowledgable on this will be along to solve the problem shortly!

[amikula]

At least this would make it easier for a company to justify digging in and fighting a patent. If they're confident they can win, they can anticipate legal expenses being reimbursed. A lot of companies who today are on the fence about whether to stand up and defend themselves would suddenly be willing to go to court.

[YummyTempura]

In theory it would, but if the company fighting the troll loses, surely that would mean they'd need to pay the troll's legal fees also?

[EGreg]

I don't think this will increase the cost of getting a patent granted. Rather, it will shift the costs / risks to the patent holder when they bring suit against defendants. They will no longer be picking on small entities to push them into capitulating out of court, but rather engage in real court cases against companies that they have a bona fide belief are infringing.

Together with boosting discovery of prior art (askpatents etc) this should go a long way towards righting the economics of the problem.

[dhimes]

OT: Got tired of Fajitas?