[marcuspovey]

No need: Using a Mac? Compromised, the NSA has root access via the Patriot act. Ditto windows. And that's before you get to the idea of remote updates to the microcode supported by modern PCs (and not even running Linux keeps you safe from that, unless you recompile your kernel to turn it off).

Lets also not forget that even the strongest crypto is vulnerable to cartel attacks and the rubber hose technique.

[dTal]

Use a one-time pad, run Linux, don't connect to the net a machine with access to the keys or the plaintext. Encrypt your message, copy the file to a formatted flash drive, and send it to your communication partner however you like. Hell, stick it on pastebin, it won't matter.

I'm confused at the perspective being espoused here - "encryption is pointless because the NSA can break anything, and failing that they can always beat you up". Encryption is not pointless, they probably can't even break standard open source crypto, they definitely can't break one-time pads which are trivially easy to make nowadays, and they can always beat you up anyway so you might as well encrypt.

There's no plausible way any of that is less safe than running the gauntlet of border security with the data in your pocket.

[wpietri]

I think you've exaggerated the perspective being espoused, so your reply is equally exaggerated.

Encryption only solves the problem of a suspicious link with perfectly trustworthy endpoints and a perfectly trustworthy side channel (for keys). Nobody is saying, "don't encrypt." But people are saying, "don't assume encryption is perfectly safe."

Also, the plausible way that physical carriage is safer is that you know when interception happens. If you encrypt everything and then use your husband's pocket as a transport medium rather than a wire, that's better data security because interception is harder, and can't be done in secret.