[shubb]

Could you explain what you mean a bit more clearly?

Traffic can be anonamised hopping it around many peers (assuming that a critical mass of them are not observed, which seems entirely likely these days).

If you sent a request to a single machine, which routed it between processes, eventually decoding the request, you are saying that the machine would not know what user made that request, and it could return the result via the same chain. But because both ends and the processing are observed, traffic analysis would yield which client asked for the file trivially. Rather like if the enemy controlled every node on your darknet, they could trivially know who you were and what you were doing.

The strength of the network is lots of nodes and lots of hops, in the hope that you will pass through enough uncontrolled ones that traffic can't be resolved. While what you suggest might, possibly reduce the risk from a compromised node in a multihop chain, it would not defeat traffic analysis, which is the major problem. Better just to inject fake traffic.

[ewillbefull]

Traffic analysis would not be a concern if the data being transferred and decoded by each program was interlaced with data from other streams. This would prevent an all-knowing adversary from following the data as it changes state through each program's execution.

And of course, the standard onion-encryption would be applied. The data on one end would be different than on the other or at any point in between. Padding to prevent size attacks, etc. (Everything Tor already does, I believe.)

The homomorphic-encryption would just allow you to 'outsource' your cryptography, routing and buffering mechanisms to a remote host, making data transfer between each individual 'identity' much faster without jeopardizing anonymity.