[zootar]

Steven Pinker on the lead theory:

There are reasons to be skeptical of any claim based on correlations between such widely separated variables as lead exposure (the cause) and crime (the effect). Consuming lead does not instantly turn someone into a criminal in the way that consuming vitamin C cures scurvy. It affects the child’s developing brain, which makes the child duller and more impulsive, which, in some children, and under the right circumstances, leads them to grow up to make short-sighted and risky choices, which, in some children and under the right circumstances, leads them to commit crimes, which, if enough young people act in the same way and at the same time, affects the crime rate. The lead hypothesis correlates the first and last link in this chain, but it would be more convincing if there were evidence about the intervening links. Such correlations should be far stronger than the one they report: presumably most kids with lead are more impulsive, whereas only a minority of impulsive young adults commit crimes. If they are right we should see very strong changes in IQ, school achievement, impulsiveness, childhood aggressiveness, lack of conscientiousness (one of the “Big Five” personality traits) that mirror the trends in lead exposure, with a suitable time delay. Those trends should be much stronger than the time-lagged correlation of lead with crime itself, which is only indirectly related to impulsiveness, an effect that is necessarily diluted by other causes such as policing and incarceration.

http://stevenpinker.com/files/pinker/files/pinker_comments_o...

[jessaustin]

This caution makes sense in general, and it is good to be skeptical of long chains of causation. However, we know so little about the brain that it's possible we're missing a much shorter chain of causation. It's possible that impulsiveness, IQ, aggression, etc. is only tenuously related to whatever aspect of the brain actually affects criminality. A very strong circumstantial case shouldn't be dismissed just because we can't think of a mechanism.

[_greim_]

> A very strong circumstantial case shouldn't be dismissed just because we can't think of a mechanism.

On the other hand, if a convincing causal chain can't be identified, it shouldn't be assumed true either. It should go into the (very large) pool of interesting possibilities that may or may not be substantiated if someone wants to invest in the time and energy to research.