Except that's not remotely the case, at all. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issues precedent binding on all the lower federal courts in the country, to the exclusion of any of the other Courts of Appeal. The FISC issues precedent binding on... no one (other than itself).
Apologies for not being excessively explicit--I was referring only to the fact that given their caseload and decisions, the CAFC often appears as a rubber stamp court for patent litigation.
I was not speaking about establishing binding precedent. However, even on that note, your argument rings hollow--the FISC has established precedent that has very much become the prevailing understanding of "legal" where its cases are concerned. That's why we've arrived at the mess we're in. Whether the precedent is binding or not is debatable, as nobody I've yet heard of is quoting FISC decisions in other law enforcement actions/cases. But when we have every official from the President onward declaring that everything is "legal" because it has been reviewed and decided upon repeatedly over the last few decades by "the courts", I think trying to make a technical argument on the binding nature of the precedents established is misguided.
FISC precedent is not binding on any federal court but FISC itself. I have never seen a FISC opinion cited to support some point of law (and only one FISA Review Court opinion so cited: 310 F.3d 717), so I think it's ridiculous to say that "the FISC has established binding precedent that has very much become the prevailing understanding of 'legal' where its cases are concerned."
FISC precedent is important in the sense that it guides FISC itself, and it guides grants of foreign intelligence warrants, but at the end of the day, if the government wants to use information collected pursuant to a FISC warrant to prosecute you, it has to do so in a regular U.S. District Court, and that court is not bound in any way by the FISC's interpretations of the law. In contrast, in a patent litigation, all the U.S. District Courts are absolutely bound by the Federal Circuit's precedent.
Are we talking past each other here, or are you just imagining a disagreement here and continuing to press a completely unrelated point?
You've said nothing materially different from me on the point that I made. You are pinpointing and continuing to dispute an off-hand comment about rubber-stamping with drawing upon the establishment of precedent and its binding nature on other courts, and again, I wasn't saying anything about that issue at all.
If I was to hazard a guess, I'd say you misunderstood the intent of my jab and are carrying forward an inconsistent comparison, cherry picking one minor detail to dispute the jab, and creating a bit of a straw man here that is completely pointless.
Here, I will say it again:
I was referring only to the fact that given their caseload and decisions, the CAFC often appears as a rubber stamp court for patent litigation. I was not speaking about establishing binding precedent [on any other courts].
Sheesh, friend. You're barking up the wrong tree here.
First, you did say something about the precedent issue, because you claimed in your second paragraph that the FISC was creating binding precedent that shaped the law in its area. That's true for the Fed. Cir., but not for FISC.
Second, and this is more pointing out an implication of your point rather than a disagreement, FISC being a rubber stamp is much less of a problem than Fed. Cir. being a rubber stamp. FISC being a rubber stamp only affects warrant requests that come in front of FISC itself. Fed. Cir. being a rubber stamp has ripple effects throughout the entire court system because it creates precedent binding on every district court and appellate court in the country.
I've tried to be very polite, but we're getting nowhere because we're talking past each other (most charitable reading I have).
My original statement, to which you replied with particulars about binding precedence, said absolutely zero about establishing precedents that bind other courts. Who cares if one court's rubber stamp affects a wider court radius than the others if they are both operating as rubber stamps for a particular kind of case and that is all that was being said?
If you want to have an exchange and dispute whether or not the CAFC operates as a patent litigator's rubber stamp in much the same way that the FISC operates as a spy agency's rubber stamp, then please do so. If not, then by the universe, stop changing the subject to something that is not of primary concern when evaluating whether or not the CAFC is a rubber-stamp patent troll's court. We have nothing to discuss on the precedent issue because I sincerely do not disagree or care to dispute the ways in which the FISC "shaped law in its area", as it is not at all related to the current thread.
[edit: removed strongly-worded-out-of-exasperation language. my apologies.]
That isn't really what gp was talking about, but your point ignores the ways decisions propagate other than hierarchical appeals.
Since the Supreme Court has created large good faith effort holes in the exclusionary rule for law enforcement, any source of reliable warrants creates an unlimited opportunity for mischief. Other courts will have to admit evidence first suspected because of information obtained through any apparently valid FISA warrant.
And since FISC is a no-work sinecure for ultra-right judges to draw a salary and benefits for occasionally showing up to rubber stamp secret warrants, it blows a hole in any restrictions on search and seizure for anyone in any court with access to FISC.