| tl;dr citation 9. If nothing else, read that. Great article. The massive scale of the NSA's operations are hardly being disputed (logging of US-based backbones, underwater cables, foreign fiber, telephone records), what is up for debate is implementation details, specific wording, and the extent of protection for US citizens.[9] The "insanely massive data collection program" has been conducted for years. PRISM is one of 504 currently active SIGADs, or intel gathering operations. "The Boundless Informant documents show the agency collecting almost 3 billion pieces of intelligence from US computer networks over a 30-day period ending in March 2013." 97 billion were collected in total over that time span.[1] The FAQ for this program clarifies that it applies to metadata. [8] edit: that's 97 billion computer records. Metadata for 124 billion phone calls was also recorded over those 30 days. The NSA does not define "collection" as actually obtaining the data or metadata, it is defined as a human analyst viewing the data.[2] 11 FISA court warrant requests have been rejected over it's existence, out of over 33,000 total. The last one rejected was in 2009.[3] Warrants are also only needed retroactively (within a 7 day period), there is no need to obtain one before accessing data.[4] According to the New York Times, "FISA orders can range from inquiries about specific people to a broad sweep for intelligence, like logs of certain search terms, lawyers who work with the orders said." [5] The Fisa Amendment Act section 702 bars the NSA from collecting data on people "reasonably believed to be located outside the United States."[4] Additionally, data can be intentionally collected on any communication that has at least one foreign recipient or sender.[6] Note also that these warrants specifically contradict the fourth amendment, but as long as the target is "reasonably believed" to be a foreigner, it doesn't matter to the NSA. The test of whether someone is located outside the US has been interpreted as a keyword-based system indicating that it is at least 51% likely. And if they aren't actually foreigners? It's nothing to worry about, just include it on a quarterly report.[7] It's also possible that a warrant for a foreigner would permit access to data on US citizens up to 2 social "hops" away, but [citation needed]. Additional reading: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/foreign-surveillance-h... Written primarily for my own benefit, posted in the hope that someone else finds it informative. p.s. This account is wholly controlled and accessed by a United States citizen. [1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-in... [2] https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/wordgames#collect [3] https://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html [4] FAA 702.g.1.B, page 6 at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ261/pdf/PLAW-110pub... [5] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/technology/tech-companies-... [6] FAA 702.b.4 [7] http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence... [8] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/08/boun... [9] http://bigstory.ap.org/article/secret-prism-success-even-big... |