[coldtea]

>I'm not sure what kind of fallacy it would be that I make decisions based on my rationally derived probability estimates. If there is such a fallacy I would love to hear about it.

The fallacy that those are "rationally derived probability estimates" instead of numbers pulled out of one's arse in the first place.

What gave you the impression that putting random intuition numbers on the P(paid)/P(free) boxes makes it "rationally derived"?

If you didn't do that, what's your methodology, and where are the source numbers of your empirical research one the matter?

[jamesaguilar]

> random intuition numbers

Are you talking about intuition numbers, or random numbers? They are fundamentally different things.

Empirical research is not the only kind of rational evidence. See http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Evidence

[coldtea]

>Are you talking about intuition numbers, or random numbers? They are fundamentally different things.

Not if your intuition is based on random feelings and thoughts instead of "empirical research".

[lutusp]

>> Are you talking about intuition numbers, or random numbers? They are fundamentally different things.

> Not if your intuition is based on random feelings and thoughts instead of "empirical research".

Actually, "random feelings" and "random numbers" really are different things. A random feeling occurs in the context of a particular individual's possible spectrum of feelings, a small subset of all feelings. But by definition, a specific random number must spring from an infinite set of random numbers to meet the technical meaning of "random".