[zarvox]

A proper writeup is in the works, but to cover the basics: we know not to implement our own crypto. :)

Passwords: we apply scrypt() before any use or storage. We never store the plaintext.

Device-to-device: standard PKI. We have a CA, and the CA's cert is bundled with the client software. Devices generate 2048-bit RSA keys at setup time. They then generate a PKCS10 CSR which our CA signs, provided you give a valid username/password. When peers wish to communicate, they establish a DTLS connection (we use OpenSSL's DTLS implementation, and AES-256-CBC as the default ciphersuite), verifying that the other device:

  * is certified by our CA to represent the claimed user and device (identity)
  * is not using a certificate with a revoked serial number
  * is trusted to send and receive information about the relevant shared folder (authorization)

Device-to-server: Everything between your machine and our servers uses TLS. Where possible, we trust only our own CA. Implementation-wise, we use Java's crypto providers for TLS.

Revocation: When you unlink or remote-wipe a device, we mark the certificate associated with that device as revoked, and notify each of your clients either immediately (if they're online) or as soon as they come online and reconnect to our push notification service that the revoked device is no longer to be trusted. (This is one of the other tasks that our servers provide - prompt delivery of device revocation information.)

We update our libraries promptly and are subscribed to the appropriate mailinglists.

Finally, if you believe you have discovered a vulnerability in some part of the AeroFS system, please contact us at [e-mail] (PGP key 6E1DC9F9, if you prefer encrypted email).

[abcd_f]

Do you use certificate pinning on the clients? I.e. once a client sees peer's cert for the first time, it should remember it and warn if it ever changed afterwards.

[zarvox]

Cert pinning only makes sense if you happen to trust multiple CAs, but want to stick to the cert issued by one particular one. We only trust one CA, and each issued cert is bound to a user and device id, so this is a non-issue. :)

[abcd_f]

No, no, no.

It has nothing to do with that. Cert pinning is used to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks whereby an attacker somehow obtains a valid certificate for peer's ID further down the road. If the certificate is not pinned, then the client will swallow a new cert without a peep, because it tracks back to a trusted CA.

Cert pinning is an equivalent of ~/.ssh/known_hosts. It allows me to pin specific public key to a peer and be notified if that key ever changes.

In your case, you might've gone with self-signed peer certs, but that would've obviously require manual verification of the peer's key on 1st contact. This is a bit of UX issue, because few people would bother to actually verify a string of hex numbers between two computers. So, naturally, you introduce a chaperon entity - your CA - that vouches for peer's credentials. I am willing to trust it, but consider it a "weak" trust that I put in place only for convenience purposes and to get stuff going quickly. Later on I may look and compare the key hashes (one provided by peer in an out of band fashion and the other I compute from my own copy of the key) and if they match only then I will know that I have a truly secure connection with the peer and that you didn't lie in your initial peer introduction. At this point I want to pin peer's key, so to be notified to repeat the manual verification process if/when the key changes.

tl;dr - Just add the cert pinning and display cert's public key hashes (mine and peers) somewhere in the UI.

[rdl]

What would make just as much (or more) sense for most of their enterprise deployments would be to let the enterprise's own PKI take over. A lot of businesses would probably want to be able to silently update keys (although I can see the value in pinning/local cache with notification on change). They may do that as part of the "custom LDAP/AD" tier.

[rdl]

Arguably you should also public key pin the key for https://www.aerofs.com/ anyway, just to get initial protection. IMO you're important enough and clueful enough to get this from Chrome, but I'm not agl.

[newman314]

ECDHE used?