[burkean]

When I read the 'science of man' and/or 'natural rights' accounts of political society and morality, I am struck my how astute Kant's critique was--that what we call conventional morality can't be found in anthropological conjecture.

But outside of the question of morality, his accounts of political society rest heavily on Enlightenment doctrine--it's basically a tale of the passions. That was the Enlightenment, not so much the rehashed civic humanism/republicanism playing itself out on the streets of Paris. And as for his infamous maxim "Argue as much as you like, but obey" and his specific engagement with questions about what the Enlightenment meant, I would say this is pretty much the mainstream of Enlightenment thought. Sure, sovereignty might lay with the nation, but to emphasize the will of the nation, rather than its legitimate representation, is something fairly unique to Rousseau and the hard-core of the Jacobins.

I know there is a body of scholarship that pins the end of the Enlightenment to Kant, but I'm not familiar with it. Could I have the elevator version?

Edit: Perhaps I've overstepped the mark here. I'd be interested in any recommendations that link Enlightenment to a positive discussion of virtue--ie. not a discussion of Enlightenment and 'why virtue is no longer required [compared to the classical republican polities]'.

[javert]

So, the original question was "Why is society and culture in the shitter," and my answer was "Kant and his philosophical henchmen." I think the Enlightenment was going in the right direction, but there was a lot of not-so-great stuff there, too. So the Enlightenment is kind of secondary to the point I'm trying to make.

Basically, there were two high points in Western society: ancient Greece, and the Renaissance/Enlightenment* era. Right now, we're not on a high point, and the slope is negative. That's because of the philosophers like Kant that came towards the end of the Renaissance/Enlightenment era.

You are actually focusing on the politics of the Enlightenment, but I'm more concerned with how Kant eventually underminded culture by corrupting things on more fundamental levels. Specifically, the metaphysical level (especially the metaphysics of man) and the epistemological level (especially the functioning of man's mind).

I'm an Objectivist (i.e., I agree with Ayn Rand's philosophy). I know this isn't a popular stance, but extremely few people who criticize it (or even who profess it in the popular media) actually know what it entails, and world-changing ideas are usually universally ridiculed at first, so I hope you'll take me seriously, despite the unpopularity of the ideas I agree with.

So the elevator version is: Ayn Rand is a direct and complete rebuttal to Kant (though not written directly in that manner). You'll have to read her extensively to get the actual rebuttal. As far as supporting the claim that Kant ended the best period in Western history, Rand states this kind of thing, but doesn't try to prove it. Later people (specifically, Leonard Peikoff) have taken up that challenge.

Among other things, Rand holds that man can perceive reality and (ultimately) gain knowledge about it, starting via sense perception. Kant held that sense perception itself acts as a filter that makes true knowledge of reality entirely impossible, basically rendering man's mind impotent.

Rand also has a unique theory of concept-formation, which is critical to establishing a solid epistemology.

Finally, Rand's ethical theory is based on the idea that the is-ought gap can actually be bridged; what is good is what is good for a man. This eventually leads to an actual justification for needing to impose individual rights (in the classic, Founding Fathers sense).

Kant was completely against all the above, and actually made the rise of Nazism, Marxism, postmodernism, and modern egalitarianism possible. In fact, I just though of this, but it's probably right to say that modern "humanistic" political thought is basically a reaction to fascism, but (unfortunately) still within the underlying paradigm Kant made possible.

For example, you need to believe that man has no access to true reality, to believe in dialectical materialism. Same thing to believe in the kind of Nazi racism and nationalism that was rooted in the ideas of the "German subconsciousness".

To elaborate on that: For Kant, the "reality" we experience was created by people's minds. So the German reality (or even the "proletarian" reality) is fundamentally different and incompatible with other "realities," and the only "proof" you need to assert that it is superior is bald assertion that it is so. I do think I'm essentializing a bit here; for example, other people after Kant took his more fundamental ideas to their logical conclusions in ways that may actually contradict other things Kant wrote, and other philosophers helped pave the way for Kant himself.

Anyway, this is just my best (condensed) understanding. I hope to whet your appetite, but don't take me as a representative of other people's ideas.

* And the high point of that era was the founding of the United States, which was the first country to be founded on the idea of the individual as sovereign.

[philwelch]

As a former Randroid, you have my sympathy and my sincere hope that you too can recover.

[javert]

What's your specific criticism of Objectivism? I'm genuinely curious.

[philwelch]

Just to start with the low-hanging fruit, Rand contradicts herself by not being an anarcho-capitalist: http://www.isil.org/ayn-rand/childs-open-letter.html

Rand might respond by saying anarcho-capitalism doesn't make sense, which it doesn't, but if it's the inevitable consequence of the rest of your philosophy then you must have made mistakes further up as well. As Rand herself said, "check your premises". Specifically, I think the unworkability of anarcho-capitalism scuppers the non-aggression principle entirely.

Rand's (and your) reading of Kant is significantly flawed. From a historical perspective I don't blame Rand for this, as it seems she may have learned this misreading of Kant from her time in Soviet-era Petrograd State University. Admittedly, this is not a criticism of Rand's philosophy but rather her understanding of the history of philosophy, but it speaks to how misaimed your statements are.

[javert]

Anarcho-capitalism is not the consequence of the rest of Objectivism, so that's the specific flaw in your reasoning. (Sorry to be blunt here, it's just easier.)

The letter you linked to is erroneous because, contra what it says, forming a "competing government" is an initiation of force. It is retaliatary force for the actual government to act to stop a "competing government."

(The next two paragraphs are kind of a tangent, the actual philosophical response to your mistake is after that.)

I don't think this is an interesting issue, though. Rand's philosophy is hierarchical: metaphysics, then epistemology, then morality, then politics. Derivative issues in politics are largely "implementation defined." For example, I don't think you can have a government without any taxes at all in today's world, whereas Rand thought no taxes would be the ideal thing to aim for. That issue doesn't have any bearing on whether Objectivism is correct or not.

As another example, I also don't care about who builds the roads, and stuff like that. If we had non-governmental roads from the start, we'd probably all live in private cities, and the world would be vastly different, but we're stuck with what we have, so who cares?

Let me change direction and go to a likely source of your error. Let me give an example. Honesty is an Objectivist virtue, so some people think you have to be honest all the time. That's not true: There is a certain context in which honesty is applicable. You don't have to be honest to a robber asking where your kids are. Likewise, non-initiation of force only applies under a system of laws and government. It's a political principle. It would not apply to people stranded on a desert island. It does not apply to a state of nature. It doesn't apply to people seeking to initially form a government. It also doesn't apply when the government is bad, past a certain "implementation defined" point (i.e., Objectivism doesn't have a specific principle for where that line is - it's too situational).

So, it's an error of context to say that the non-aggression is some universal moral rule that implies that we all have to have anarcho-capitalism. It's not a moral rule, it's a political rule. It's part of the next level up.

This is true in the same way (more or less) that honesty is not a universal moral rule. Understanding the context for honesty requires understanding the actual more fundamental principle it derives from, which is to always act in a way that serves your own life and happiness. (Which, itself, even has a context that depends on hierarchically previous ideas - Rand was not against suicide in the case of losing a precious loved one, for example, if you can't conceive of living happily without that person.)

> Rand's (and your) reading of Kant is significantly flawed.

I don't claim that I can provide evidence for the things I say about Kant, because that evidence presupposes agreement on fundamentals of Objectivism, and that's not something I can provide evidence for either, other than pointing to reality and suggesting someone undertake a multi-year study of the Objectivist literature. So, the stuff about Kant is just intended as a "sampler," something to get someone thinking and maybe intrigued.

Putting the Kant stuff aside, I'd be genuinely interested to see what your reaction (again) to what I've said.

(Two more tangential paragraphs follow.)

By the way, normal people do not have the epistemological background to _not_ make errors that have to do with disassociating abstractions (concepts, principles) from the concretes they refer to. Ayn Rand calls that "rationalism," and I think that's the category in which your mistake falls. Many normal people (especially those drawn to programming) habitually think this way. That's how I was for most of my life, and the only thing that kept drawing me back to Objectivism was honestly realizing that nothing else made sense, and knowing that there was more background to Objectivism that I still lacked.

Most people who aren't rationalistic people just don't trust abstractions _at all_. For example, pragmatists who say that there are no rules, or people who say that no knowledge is really trustworthy. This is throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

[philwelch]

> forming a "competing government" is an initiation of force

How?

> I don't think this is an interesting issue, though. Rand's philosophy is hierarchical: metaphysics, then epistemology, then morality, then politics. Derivative issues in politics are largely "implementation defined." For example, I don't think you can have a government without any taxes at all in today's world, whereas Rand thought no taxes would be the ideal thing to aim for. That issue doesn't have any bearing on whether Objectivism is correct or not.

Surely one derives from the other, and contradictory conclusions at one level should indicate flaws at a higher level. "Check your premises."

> So, it's an error of context to say that the non-aggression is some universal moral rule that implies that we all have to have anarcho-capitalism. It's not a moral rule, it's a political rule. It's part of the next level up.

Then surely this defines Objectivist politics down towards nothing at all, since it can be violated at the point where it's necessary for a government to maintain monopoly over the use of force, and it can be violated before there's a government, and so forth.

If you want to abandon Objectivist politics entirely you may, but the main selling point of Rand is her ability to derive "privately owned roads" from "the validity of the senses" (qua "concepts in a hat": http://mol.redbarn.org/objectivism/ConceptsInAHat/)

> I don't claim that I can provide evidence for the things I say about Kant, because that evidence presupposes agreement on fundamentals of Objectivism, and that's not something I can provide evidence for either, other than pointing to reality and suggesting someone undertake a multi-year study of the Objectivist literature. So, the stuff about Kant is just intended as a "sampler," something to get someone thinking and maybe intrigued.

The stuff about Kant is, to give largely the same handwavy explanation, utterly wrong as well. Rand may have built up Kant as a kind of straw man, but this isn't an honest or realistic reading of Kant. Rand's misreading of Kant is an honest mistake and a historical accident, not a useful introduction to Objectivism.

> normal people do not have the epistemological background to _not_ make errors that have to do with disassociating abstractions (concepts, principles) from the concretes they refer to. Ayn Rand calls that "rationalism," and I think that's the category in which your mistake falls

I think it's Rand who makes this error by making measurement omission so central to her epistemology.

> the only thing that kept drawing me back to Objectivism was honestly realizing that nothing else made sense

It's interesting that you have this psychological need for everything to make sense to you within a comprehensive system. This is the biggest and most problematic appeal of ideologues and systematists in philosophy, whether Rand or Hegel.