[droithomme]

> It's a fundamental principal in our legal system that intent matters.

Context error.

If Bob dies by falling off a bridge while I am grabbing at him, my intent matters a lot. Was it completely an accident, Bob slipped and fell and I tried to pull him back? Or did I hate Bob and plot for months to kill him and was pushing him? From a distance the two things may look the same - it's important to figure out what I was thinking.

But let's say I dislike Bob and even once wrote a blog post about him and his annoying toenail clipping habits several years ago. Some people might even speculate I would not be unhappy if annoying old "Toenail Bob" was dead. I haven't actually done anything to Bob though. Charging me with murder at this point because it is speculated I am thinking about killing Bob and might do so in the future on account of my having complained years ago about his toenail clipping habits would be prosecuting a thought crime. Even if I happen to have bought an axe and rope recently. Or maybe I even stole the axe. What about that? So I could be prosecuted for stealing the axe, that's fair. But prosecute me for killing Toenail Bob because I once disliked his clipping protocols? Claiming that is reasonable to charge people with things they may or may not be thinking of doing but have not actually done because "It's a fundamental principal in our legal system that intent matters." just doesn't make sense. Especially when there's plenty of evidence the axe and rope were for some other purpose, such as I buy a new axe every winter, I need the rope for my spelunking hobby, or I have an established and documented history of downloading large datasets as a professional academic researcher in order to do statistical analysis on them.

[GHFigs]

Your analogy doesn't fit, as Aaron was not charged with something analogous to murder.

It would be more akin to attacking, but not killing, Bob after having publicly declared that "It is a moral imperative that we should kill Bob." You might then be charged with attempted murder. The law[1] recognizes attempt and conspiracy to attempt as crimes, just as it would if you had attempted to or conspired to kill Bob.

This is not "thoughtcrime", either: it still requires you to take a swing at him with your axe.

I have an established and documented history of downloading large datasets as a professional academic researcher in order to do statistical analysis on them.

Consider (again, because I mentioned this in reply to you once before) that Aaron did not make use of his status as an academic researcher when he did what he did. It might have made a good defense had he gone to trial, but it isn't a magic bullet that absolved him of scrutiny for what he was observed doing.

[1] http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030

[droithomme]

You bring up attempt, but we both know perfectly well he did not attempt to distribute papers. It's clear at this point you are arguing in bad faith and making specious arguments.

[GHFigs]

I assure you, it's just a misunderstanding. I am not saying or in any way attempting to imply that he attempted to distribute papers. In fact, I will emphatically state that Aaron Swartz was not charged with attempting to distribute the papers he downloaded. That's the reason the analogy doesn't work: it's not only that he didn't "kill Bob", it's that nobody even accused him of killing Bob.

If you look at the law, it's the combination of the actions that we all tend to agree that he did (the downloading and what that entailed) with the (alleged) intent of republishing them that constitutes the crime he was charged with.

[AnthonyMouse]

>If you look at the law, it's the combination of the actions that we all tend to agree that he did (the downloading and what that entailed) with the (alleged) intent of republishing them that constitutes the crime he was charged with.

Except...no. He wasn't charged with copyright infringement, he was charged with violating the CFAA and wire fraud. How is whether or not he would have subsequently infringed copyright by publishing the papers to the world relevant to whether he committed those crimes?

That's why this is a big deal. The DoJ came in and said "we think he's going to commit a copyright crime after downloading all these papers, look at his politics" but they couldn't prove that (or else why didn't they charge him with it?), so they poked around for something entirely different to charge him with even though their motivation in prosecuting him was to punish him for the thing they couldn't prove he was going to do. Raise your hand if you think that's how prosecution decisions are supposed to be made.

[GHFigs]

he was charged with violating the CFAA and wire fraud

Um, yeah. That's exactly the law[1] I am referring to. That's why I linked to it before and why I'll link to it again. Go read it. Because the rest of your comment is just plain ignorant, and please understand: I don't mean that as an insult. You may mean well, but it's really counterproductive to make up your mind about something while remaining untethered to reality.

[1] http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030 (You may find the phrase "and with intent" to be relevant to answering both of your questions.)

[AnthonyMouse]

The only place "and with intent" appears in the linked statute is when it makes up the phrase "and with intent to defraud." I'm not seeing how an intention to post articles on the internet would defraud anyone, so how is possible intent to infringe copyright going to satisfy a requirement for intent to defraud? Does the CFAA have some non-standard definition of "defraud" that I'm not aware of that would encompass copyright infringement?

[snowwrestler]

This is silly. Intent matters but no one said it is solely sufficient for prosecution. Aaron was not being prosecuted for owning a laptop and network cable, he was being prosecuted for what he actually did with them--which is not under dispute. In that context, it is legally valid (i.e. not a sign of special political tampering) to consider prior statements when establishing his intent while acting.

[thejsjunky]

> Claiming that is reasonable to charge people with things they may or may not be thinking of doing but have not actually done because "It's a fundamental principal in our legal system that intent matters."

You seem to be rather severely misunderstanding my post - please read it again.