[kyllo]

Is this YAML vulnerability something that can be patched in relatively short order without Rails itself having to be completely rewritten?

Or should I basically just not run Rails on any machine ever anymore, get a different web server, and start implementing my own request routing and ORM without any sort of YAML-parsing magic?

>One of my friends who is an actual security researcher has deleted all of his accounts on Internet services which he knows to use Ruby on Rails. That’s not an insane measure.

So anyone who uses Twitter, for example, could have their passwords and other data stolen through this exploit?

[patio11]

Is this YAML vulnerability something that can be patched in relatively short order without Rails itself having to be completely rewritten?

Long story short: There's a variety of things that can be done to mitigate this vulnerability and an active conversation on which is the best option. My go-to suggestion would be having Rails ship with either a non-stdlib YAML serialization/deserialization parser or have it modify the stdlib one, with the major point of departure being "Raise an exception immediately if the YAML encodes any object not on a configurable whitelist, and default that whitelist to ~5 core classes generally considered to be safe."

Or should I basically just not run Rails on any machine ever anymore, get a different web server, and start implementing my own request routing and ORM without any sort of YAML-parsing magic?

That is astonishingly unlikely to be a net-win for your security.

So anyone who uses Twitter, for example, could have their passwords and other data stolen through this exploit?

I'd expect that Twitter (in particular) has a better handle on it than your average startup, but successful exploitation of this means the attacker owns the server, if the attacker owns the server they probably get all the servers, and they will tend to gain control of any information on all of the servers. That can include, but is certainly not upper-bounded by, passwords/hashes stored in the database. It is absolutely possible, and indeed likely, that many people will be adversely affected by this vulnerability without themselves running Rails or even, for that matter, knowing what Rails is.

[kyllo]

>>Or should I basically just not run Rails on any machine ever anymore, get a different web server, and start implementing my own request routing and ORM without any sort of YAML-parsing magic?

>That is astonishingly unlikely to be a net-win for your security.

In the long run, you are probably right. Once this gets fixed, which will probably be soon considering how much attention is on it.

But in the short run, is there anything worse than a vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to automatically detect, penetrate, and execute arbitrary code on your machine? To the point where it's not even safe to run the framework on localhost on your dev box?

[ianburrell]

I think you could make YAML safer and still support most usage by just preventing the deserializer from making any explicit native types. Just support the default types (string, list, map) and ignore all language specific tags. In fact, it looks like the core schema defined in the YAML spec would serve this purpose and would have similar types to JSON.

By making that the default schema, developers would have to explicitly request the dangerous "ruby" schema that makes arbitrary Ruby objects.