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by sociotech
4897 days ago
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What exactly is Boyle's argument? He rehashes the now-typical hagiography. Then he seems to argue that should influence legal policy. This is wrong for two reasons. One, the hagiography is factually wrong, no matter how generously anyone uses the word "genius." Two, conclusions about prosecutorial discretion do not follow from it. We need to distinguish between decisions made before and after Aaron's death. It is totally fair to say that Kerr's blogposts - or my attempts to remind programmers what they thought about Aaron when he was alive - lack "sympathy." But what exactly does Boyle think should have made the prosecutors sympathetic to Aaron when they brought their charges against him? His lawyers' claim that he might be psychologically unstable? His desire for attention from the geek community? His on-and-off friendship with Lessig or Doctorow? His history of writing code as a volunteer? His involvement in a sale of a company to Conde-Nast? To use my example from another thread, let's say Brian Behlendorf gets arrested for DUI while on the way to a conference to talk about free software. Should we be sympathetic because he gave us the Apache httpd server (something a thousand times - maybe a hundred thousand times - more significant than any code Aaron ever wrote)? By the by, I do feel like a jerk for not being more "sympathetic" to Aaron now that he is dead. But when the people around you turn your case into a political football and say the government killed you, it is fair game to try to put things into perspective. |
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Regarding both what you've written and what Kerr has written, I think it's worth pointing out that "sympathy" isn't a prerequisite for discussing the legal issues involved in the Swartz case. It's annoying that everyone who writes about the CFAA needs to provide a benediction. The Swartz tragedy does not want for sympathy, emotion, or action-spurring anger. But we can always use more (respectful) critical thinking.
It's especially annoying in critiques of Kerr's writing. Kerr's goals were to answer some basic questions. Did the prosecution stretch the CFAA to make a case against Swartz where none was warranted? Was the prosecution's conduct towards Swartz unusually cruel? Is there any legitimate public policy purpose animating the CFAA and wire fraud statutes? In discussing these questions, Kerr more or less stipulates that Swartz did what prosecutors alleged he did. But that's all it is: a stipulation. "Assuming", Kerr asks, "that Swartz did all this stuff --- and it looks like he did --- let us take a clear-eyed look at whether and how any miscarriage of justice occurred."
To berate Kerr for not adequately addressing the question of Swartz's innocence is to miss the point of the two articles.