[inigyou]

I agree, it's very convenient to have a phone full of corporate malware. But I thought the point of GrapheneOS was to escape that. My corporate malware only runs on my secure card processor which sits in a pocket glued to my phone.

[microtonal]

But I thought the point of GrapheneOS was to escape that.

I think the point of GrapheneOS is being as secure as possible first and within those parameters give people the choice how much of Google they want. They have implemented sandboxed Google Play Services for a reason. Many people need Play Services for practical reasons (e.g. because they need to run apps that require it), so let's then run it in the most secure/private way possible - make it a sandboxed app, allowing users to decide whether to install it or not and if they choose to, that they can assign/revoke permissions like any other Android app.

[miroljub]

The very moment it becomes possible to create a Google Pay alternative, there will be at least a dozen choices, some of them fully open source and privacy conserving.

The only reason why we don’t have them is Google / Apple duopoly.

[inigyou]

It's possible right now, but you have to (as Google did) convince all banks, merchants, and card networks to let them use your system.

[stavros]

You're begging the question. The entire premise of this thread is "we should be able to pay without infesting our phone with corporate malware".

[inigyou]

Well yes, but attacking Graphene for that is attacking the wrong layer. If you want an open payments system the government has to mandate it, or you could take the low chance of success with the free market competition method.

[microtonal]

IMO the most annoying thing is that Google could solve this problem today by just adding the GrapheneOS signing keys to the whitelisted keys. Instead they decide to exclude GrapheneOS because security, while attesting phones that are still on Android 13 (multiple years without fixes for vulnerabilities that are not marked high/critical) and did not apply ASB patches for up to 12 months.

A first step would be requiring Google to attest all devices that have a locked bootloader, verified boot, signed with non-public keys, and have a recent Android version and patch level.

IMO they should also boot anything older than Android 16 and behind more than 1-2 ASBs, if security is the real reason to have Play Integrity remote attestation.

[inigyou]

POSIWID: the purpose of remote attestation is to force people to buy devices that pay Google license fees.

[stavros]

I read the very first message of the thread as "if you're going to regulate something, regulate that we should be able to pay without requiring Google", ie with Graphene and the like. I didn't read it as an attack on Graphene.