9 years of philosophy and I'm over platonic realism and reading contemporary philosophy of science.
The thing is, we are wrong, but this stuff is useful to make predictions. Everyone knows about the copernican revolution. But when it first happened, the old models(earth at the center of the solar system) were more accurate at predicting where the plenets would be.
Scientists pragmatically spend their time doing best fits. (Typically)
But then the paradigm shifts and we are closer to reality than the current local minimum/maximum.
Before reading philosophy of science, I was into m theory and string theory. Now I'm nearly sure it's bunk that might be replaced in our lifetime.
The difference with the Copernican stuff is that you can fly a satellite (e.g. Voyager) to the edge of the solar system, look back, and see the planets orbiting the sun. There is no sane way to put the earth in the center once you do that. If I do a push up the Earth moves beneath me but no reasonable person says I'm pushing the Earth away. Hence I feel heliocentrism is simply an observable fact. It's not a mathematical convenience. It's a fact you can see with a camera. The relativism or perspective argument is irrelevant because as we established you have to be very unreasonable to describe a picture of a huge ass sun that hardly moves with small planets zooming around it as earth centric.
On the other hand nobody has observed any particle or ever will, we only see effects of particles (cloud chamber trails, other particles, radiation, etc). This makes it very different for the traditional "seeing is believing" claim. In this case you actually possible to argue it's a mathematical convenience. It's possible to say we are stuck in the pre Copernican age in QM, we're modelling these things in such a complicated way, maybe one day we will see aha we got it all backwards, electrons are actually made of trapped light, or some crazy theory will come out... And I can't blame string theorists and physicists in general for trying.
Take for example quarks. QCD actually forbids naked quarks. That means you can never observe one on its own. How's that for a falsifiable scientific theory? Yet it is very successful in all its predictions. So obviously the Popperian "falsifiability" is too simple a criteria for science.
In the 1500s, it might just as well be impossible to fly a spaceship to the outer edge of the solar system to confirm heliocentrism without doubt as it is right now to build a solar system sized detector to look for the graviton.
> Hence I feel heliocentrism is simply an observable fact.
It isn't. You can easily define a coordinate system for the universe in which the earth is the center.
Heliocentrism just makes some approximate computations easier because the sun is so heavy. Thus in heliocentrism, the orbits of the planets are approximately ellipses (near-circles) around the sun, while in a geocentric model, the orbits have more complicated shapes.
Nevertheless (to explicare "approximate" even in the Newtonian gravity model (i.e. not Einsteinian gravity)) be aware that even in the heliocentric coordinate system the earth (and the other planets) don't move along an elliptical (near-circular) orbit around the sun, but both the sun and the planet move around a common center which is near to the sun.
> There is no sane way to put the earth in the center once you do that. [...] Hence I feel heliocentrism is simply an observable fact. It's not a mathematical convenience. It's a fact you can see with a camera. The relativism or perspective argument is irrelevant because as we established you have to be very unreasonable to describe a picture of a huge ass sun that hardly moves with small planets zooming around it as earth centric.
Modern physics really is about that there is no preferred coordinate system: this manifests itself in the fact that conserved quantities can be derived via Noether's theorem from such symmetries in the natural laws. There is just a choice of a coordinate system which in our solar system makes computations easier.
Geocentric coordinates are easily observable; just look at the sunrise and sunset. And if you zoom out even more and look at the galaxy, heliocentric coordinates become unreasonable.
And at the speed at which the solar system is orbiting the galaxy, I don't know that it would even look much like like the planets are orbiting the sun.
> The difference with the Copernican stuff is that you can fly a satellite (e.g. Voyager) to the edge of the solar system, look back, and see the planets orbiting the sun.
Or you can put the satellite in the back of a truck and back the truck out of your garage and see the sun orbiting the earth. Yet it remains sane to put anywhere in the center depending on your context.
If you have a reasonable grasp of Newtonian gravity you would also be unable to conclude that. A wrestler flailing a skinny guy around, from the POV of the skinny guy, is still definitely not the skinny guy flailing the wrestler about. I don't see what's to argue here. Given all facts, then there is no POV that results in the conclusion the sun goes round the earth. Just like how there's no placement of the camera that results in you claiming I'm pushing the earth away.
I agree with the example of human agents because we can acknowledge concepts like will, choice, agency, etc. But none of those ideas are present in Newton's laws of motions.
Will, choice, and agency are unnecessary for explaining the example. It can be described simply by the forces exerted. The locations of the observers or sensing equipment matter little in this case, though they do become problematic when attempting discern whether heliocentric model fits unaided observations from a planetary surface.
> Yet it is very successful in all its predictions. So obviously the Popperian "falsifiability" is too simple a criteria for science.
Those two sentences contradict each other. If something unobservable implies some observable, i.e. predictable, consequences, then falsifying these predictions would also falsify the unobservable antecedents.
The hidden variable/better (unknown) alternative theory problem is what he is referring to.
Newtonian Mechanics are falsifiable, but no one could figure out an example that actually did so, until roughly when the orbit of Mercury was fully observed.
That is true. I'm not arguing for that standpoint, but it works perfectly fine for all classical matters and has been since Descartes.
I think in a common sense way you do get what I mean though when I say it is obvious that when we see two billiard balls colliding we know it but when think of electrons colliding it is only indirectly through whatever happens after the collision, never the process itself.
We saw the things that were easy to see long ago. Now we're seeing the things that are harder to see. That is, of course, harder, and more complicated, and only gets worse as we probe deeper, with more and more indirection, but I think all the stuff we are seeing has a pretty good grounding so far that it's actually something we are seeing indirectly and not a model artifact, at least until you get to quarks and gravitational waves, and we definitely can't see the strings of string theory.
From what I've read, a problem with the Copernican model was that it assumed circular orbits. Galileo insisted on this as well. It doesn't matter what orbits what, if you've got the shape of the orbits wrong.
Oddly enough the Catholic astronomers were willing to accept a model that had the sun going around the earth, and the planets around the sun. What settled matters for them was Newtonian physics, which provided a way to detect whether the earth was rotating or not. That was what caused them to eventually lift their ban on Copernicus. Newtonian physics also eliminated the question of whether anything in the solar system is justifiably the center of the cosmos.
> The thing is, we are wrong, but this stuff is useful to make predictions.
This statement itself predicades on a Platonic realist metaphysics! Indeed, what is the ideal against which things are judge right and wrong? I think the psychological roots of Enlightenment rationality run deep in the West, making it brutally hard to usurp.
That said, I think we can go a long way in this one case by just throwing out the "wrong" judement and laser focusing on the particulars of utility that science provides. One zoomed-out facet sees it as a collaborative effort as squeezing out repeatable processes, a la Popper et al.
> The thing is, we are wrong, but this stuff is useful to make predictions
I understand where you're coming from but this is a very cynical take. String theory is a strawman compared to the empirical "discoveries" of items like black holes or the Higgs boson.
Aye, but we only sorta kinda "know" what things like black holes might be. We have models that make sense to us based on our understanding of science, and we think our instruments can faithfully report on what they can be with measurements we believe we are making correctly, but we have no clue what we don't know, and no real way to prove it, just theorize, and sort of bundle up what we believe is data supporting it.
We have very good ideas about it, including the issue described in the OP. We also don't know how gravity and the other forces work together. We don't know where other life is in the universe. We don't know how to travel to other stars. We don't know what is under the surface of Europa (but we'll soon find out).
And we have a very good idea of what we know because our theories, based on our observations, predict things accurately.
The original upthread comment and followup seem like taking some philosophical questions to logical extremes.
There are so many observations that fit the theory at this point, that we know there is a supermassive black hole in the center of our galaxy just as well as we knew the earth orbited the sun before the voyager flight.
Well, not really. We can hypothesize there is certainly something _very_weird_ going on in the center, and we kinda know weird things happen at super-densities, and we can conjecture based on our understandings of things like gravity and celestial collapses, but any new black holes or even ones we know of that might have occured won't be in our timeframe, and we can never actually witness one even if it were (short of it suddenly happening to our own glowy ball of gas, but there'd hardly be a you to witness it)...
People like Wheeler and Hawking came up with theories and people basically sought to prove or disprove them, but maybe we have a limited capacity to think outside of those boxes. Like, who really knows, maybe the big bang had similarities... who knows how being close to a black hole really affects stuff like space-time curvature.
Well, it seems that the question still remains somewhat open. There are theories that fit the data as well or better than the black-hole model.
My naive intuition is that this is mostly just physicist publishing papers and throwing some exotic ideas out (we still don't know enough about dark matter), and that the black-hole model will remain as the consensus. But it's not as unquestionable as you say it is.
> An alternative to the black hole (BH) scenario has been recently proposed in terms of a supermassive compact object composed of self-gravitating fermionic dark matter (DM).
I am one of those people that feel that dark matter is not something humans should be studying too much. Just like hadrons, wormholes, and those people interested in creating lab-based little black holes. It strikes me as naive and dangerous to assume all physics is meant to be studied. Just because we know splitting atoms can make really big explosions, for instance, doesn't mean it might not have had other effects on the fabric of the universe we lack the mental facilities, advanced knowledge, or context to fathom.
Black holes are simply a consequence of GR, which has made more successful predictions than just about any physical theory. Did M-branes make any successful predictions?
@shusaku> "The more you know, the more you realize you don’t know to whom you should ascribe a quote."
Well, so far I see variants of this particular quote from Aristotle, Einstein, and Voltaire. Someone else probably said it earlier than any of 'em probably, but I honestly don't care enough to dig any deeper than this. Besides, half the time I've dug deeper into Mark Twain or Albert Einstein quotes (just for a couple really common examples) I find that they're attributed with saying a thing they never actually said anyhow, so... :shrug:
The Higgs and black holes are quite different. We've basically observed Higgs according to how we've defined them, while we've only observed phenomena consistent with black holes as we hypothesize them. Singularities are the result of theories based on (ironically named) real numbers, it's entirely possible that what we call black holes are really dark stars formed from exotic matter that can only exist in hyper-extreme conditions, like a leveled up neutron star.
The difference is that we have theorerically sound formation scenarious for black holes under very broad conditions, and we have absolutely no model for a formation scenario of such an exotic dark star.
Observations keep poking holes in those hypotheses (I’m not sure they even count as theories). We keep finding black holes with anomalous masses, or black holes that formed too early.
Part of the problem is that we have very little observational data. But another big problem is that our best ideas, based on general relativity are known to be incompatible with quantum mechanics.
The thing is we have a lot of models which make very accurate predictions most of the time, which are useful for doing some impressive science.
But we have no accepted theory of what is actually happening behind the math. What we have is that in 1925 most theoretical physicists decided that we have already uncovered the most fundamental structures of the universe and further investigation into how or why things are the way they are is fruitless. This view has dominated for the last 100 years. Physics has been focused only on modeling and testing, but nobody knows exactly what the models are telling us about the universe.
I agree with the above poster that this is wrong and we may yet learn that our models are only very close to reality, but the actual mechanics are different. At least I think more research should be pointed in this direction.
> in 1925 most theoretical physicists decided that we [are done]
No. Just... no. Even advancing that fifty years to 1975, the Standard Model reigns not because people want it to reign, but because no one can knock it off its throne. There is no better idea that can explain more than the Standard Model can. It's not a conspiracy.
(I did used to joke with my students that progress in physics stopped around 1975, which is around when LSD got banned, so there might well be a lack of ideas. But I'll leave that one to the reader!)
From my understanding of the parent I think he's not saying that nothing is trying to replace the standard model etc. But instead nobody is trying to explain the standard model (or whatever).
For example, wavefunction collapse. You can see the wikipedia page for all its interpretations. There's no such page for Newtonian dynamics (even though gravity is also spooky action at a distance) and classical EM (you're telling me there's more of these fields everywhere I can't see).
I think it's simply because classical experiments are a primary source and quantum experiments are a secondary source of information. The classical case you just see and know the result. Quantum experiments you're always looking at some medium that detects or measures or whatever the original interaction. So you're only interrogating the detector, not the original particles or interaction. So of course we're stuck with an interpretation problem. It's the same problem with news. The primary sources are always 100% certain what happened because they saw it. The secondary source will allow for more interpretation because they have heard from multiple primary sources, etc.
> Quantum experiments you're always looking at some medium that detects or measures or whatever the original interaction. So you're only interrogating the detector, not the original particles or interaction.
Exactly, waveform collapse is a philosophical question, it’s not an actual problem for the theory.
I'm reticent of falling into this endless conversation again, but it's a bit addictive.
I believe the point is that the Standard Model is still built on Quantum Field Theory, but looking into what's really going on under quantum mechanics is a bit taboo and very few people are spending time on it.
Frankly, I acknowledge that I am an outsider and that surely my perspective is far too naive and simplistic, I'm sure the reality in the field is far more nuanced. But still, I'm in good company when I question what's going on, like Einstein and many other prominent physicists have.
It is true that the end of the conversation was just "shut up and calculate", which is wise on some level, but it also implies that the mathematical model is the end-truth and you should unquestionably just build on it. There is a consensus that the mathematical model of quantum theory is really what is mechanistically happening, and that the wave function is a real physical thing.
But one can also argue that it is merely a probabilistic theory that, yes, describes the probability distributions of what will happen extremely accurately, but still is a partial answer and it doesn't actually predict what will happen. In every other context, we use probability to describe processes that we don't have a complete model for. It is a bit presumptuous to think that in quantum mechanics probabilities are somehow fundamental and not emerging from more deterministic underlying phenomena.
You can have a theory that says that there's an equal likelyhood of getting heads or tails on a coin, and that theory can reflect the statistics extremely accurately. But that is obviously not the end of the story, there are deeper mechanics determining if you get heads or tails at each given time, it is not fundamentally random, you just don't fully understand what's going on yet.
But the real litmus test is and always has been "can a theory predict the results of empirical measurements (such as controlled experiments) more accurately than its competitors".
The Danish-interpretation quantum physicists might urge you to shut up and calculate, but what we lack is any model capable of both describing why and how the wave function collapses and simultaneously offering more accurate predictions than QM does. The most well known low hanging fruit being: describing events in noticeably curved spacetime (or put in other words, in situations where the effects of gravity are non-trivial) because we don't even need a better model to know that QM breaks there, QM itself will happily tell us that much by piling on infinities and singularities that can no longer be canceled via renormalization.
So the take home is less "shut up and calculate" and more "don't waste their time with speculation about underlying mechanics until it can also offer more accurate predictions, and until then redirect your energies back to calculating: making use out of the tool we already have at least".
If nothing else, familiarity with the tool that does work up to a certain standard is more likely to lead someone to the next big step than hanging back in the wings of Newton and Aristotle with layperson intuitions about macroscopic objects in terrestrial gravity.
I remember reading the Three Body Problem, and thinking to myself: this is implausible. If scientists started getting weird results, they'd be thrilled, not suicidal!
I believe the alien scientists were depressed by the guaranteed collapse of their civilization, not the difficulty of certain differential equations. So it's more like a doctor getting weird results while working on a cure for a pandemic.
Edit: oops, see the reply below... and my grumpy response. I seriously forgot about that entire plot point.
I'm pretty sure they're referring to scientists on Earth.
Edit: Though I agree that alien scientists of Tri-Solaris probably lead more depressing lives than their counterparts on earth
I don't know if this series is yet considered far enough in the past that we don't have to worry about spoiler warnings (I feel like the house rules about this apply differently to books than to movies), but I will just say that one of the most fascinating and mind-bending considerations in the book is the idea that some civilizations progress linearly and some progress exponentially, and how mind bending it is to have to plan ahead for exponential advances.
Hmm, fair enough - I checked Wikipedia. My mind completely erased the "sophon" bit or whatever it was called, it just got erased again. Not a fan of that particular fairy dust.
I thought they were referring to the inability of the aliens to make an accurate calendar.
No, I was referring to the human scientists' reaction to the sophons' interference.
But I thought that the Trisolarians' inability to predict their planets' path also seemed weird. Yes, the three-body problem isn't analytically solvable, but you can brute force it, and I would imagine that a species that is capable of creating sophons and starships with hulls made out of the Strong-force could calculate their planet's trajectory for the next thousand years without too many problems. (It would be academic, anyway - if you can build that kind of technology, why do you even need planets?)
That's actually a great example for what it is. If I were a scientist I probably wouldn't be reacting with "yay science" to every next failure that destroys civilization, even if notionally those are building up the body of data that could eventually lead to success.
I can’t imagine aliens better suited for space travel than the Trisolarans. For them, deep hibernation is a natural state and they could easily build space ships to explore other nearby systems and seed them. Even better - their metabolism made them perfect for deep space habitats.
I seem to remember something about the scientist being distraught because physics didn't make sense, not because she was having trouble getting clean data.
That also stuck with me as weird: there are any number of places you could sabotage a precision physics experiment by injecting tiny amounts of noise, which would drive the scientists to think they were bad scientists. Instead they thought science was broken.
As someone who has looked for inconsistencies with the Standard Model for a while now, and seen every measurement land bang-on the prediction, I can say that I would love any deviation that said our existing theories are broken.
And sure, crank up the detector noise and we'd be sad, but ask any grad student: having your apparatus suddenly spit out garbage data is just an average day. I've known plenty of scientists with psychological problems but it's never coming from their data.
>That also stuck with me as weird: there are any number of places you could sabotage a precision physics experiment by injecting tiny amounts of noise, which would drive the scientists to think they were bad scientists. Instead they thought science was broken.
I think in the context of the book, the specific means of sabotage was something close to impossible to figure out, so I can see the despair of checking every conceivable explanation, coming up empty, and making an inference about reality itself. And it wasn't a kind of peripheral, controllable amount of noise, it was a complete global sabotage of all particle physics, on a scale that amounted to a global catastrophe rather than just another blip in the daily grind.
I think one thing that really hooked me on the book series in the beginning was being able to appreciate the kind of cosmic despair one scientist was sharing during the pool table conversation, because thinking big about meaning and order in the universe, and how important the universes' intelligibility is to our relationship with it, informed by data, is a synthesis of things that really matter to me as a reader - taking the intersection of science and meaning seriously.
I don't think that would be enough for plausibly explaining particular scientists offing themselves, but the psychology of someone to whom that kind of question matters that much, which is very much the heart and soul of what drives my interest in non-fiction reading, seems tragically underrepresented as a driving motivation in fiction which I think is terribly unfortunate. But sci-fi sometimes cares about it, and sometimes a lot.
How do you mean? I cannot remember any particular scientific revolution where scientists were suicidal, or even particularly crestfallen.
Quantum Mechanics is the closest thing I can think of, where Einstein famously refused to accept some of the implications, and where scientists had great disagreements about things like the Copenhagen interpretation and what it means for the actual nature of reality - but I don't think any of them were sad about it.
One of the boldest chapter one introductions I've ever seen comes to mind:
Ludwig Boltzmann, who spent much of his life studying statistical mechanics, died in 1906, by his own hand. Paul Ehrenfest, carrying on the work, died similarly in 1933. Now it is our turn to study statistical mechanics.
A very interesting story that's worth reading up on. "Natural philosophers" of the day refused to accept the idea of a particle too small to directly observe on purely philosophical grounds. They essentially bullied him out of the field for championing the idea of the atom, despite his math yielding numerous correct results. They fruitlessly pursued the idea of energetics instead. (One of the many instances of die hard philosophers playing the villain in physics history. See also why Emmy Noether wasn't given a professorship despite a letter of recommendation from Albert Einstein.)
This makes it perhaps not a particularly good example of the phenomena being discussed, as he was suicidal not because of what he had discovered, but because no one believed what he had discovered.
Those are definitely unfortunate examples and I can see how those environments pushed them to their limits. But if we're talking large-scale systematic thinking about what kind of data would be necessary to show that there's such a thing as a typical, characteristic civilization scale negative reaction to scientific revolutions, these don't demonstrate that this is the usual case. Obviously they're important in their own right.
But also the book doesn't suggest that scientists going missing was just a function of humanity's customary response to scientific progress. In the book, it's a very intentional sabotage campaign.
> wound up in an insane asylum for suggesting surgeons should wash their hands.
Was rejected and mocked by the medical community for his idea, developed a drinking problem and eventually committed to an asylum by his colleagues after having a nervous breakdown. While in the asylum he was beaten by the guards and died from a wound infection ... yikes!!
The person you replied to was clearly asking of examples where some large paradigm shift caused large scale instances of suicidal thoughts, self harm, or otherwise, as a direct result of these new ideas.
Providing two cases is, first of all, certainly not anything like "large scale". Second, these two cases are in complete and total isolation of each other, so not evidence of people getting riled up over the same new idea. And third, these seem like extreme reactions to people not believe their OWN ideas, not reactions to other scientists presenting new ideas.
I'm a plasma physicist, and personally I love weird results - new mysteries to solve! That said, there are a wide range of personality types out there. And I would also be extremely surprised if the correct solution to some particular weird result was, for instance, that the Maxwell equations are broken for that regime (other than expected quantum corrections, e.g. the Schwinger limit).
Yeah. In principal, scientists should be excited by weird results. In practice, though, humans are complex creatures with intellectual and emotional inertia. There's an understandable element of dread when you realize your life's work finds itself on shaky ground.
Specially because only particle physics suddenly became inconsistent. I can see scientists fruitlessly obsessing with finding why the universe was toying with them, but suicide? OK, they were also seeing intent with individualized hallucinations, and computer interference, but IIRC those messages asked them to to stop particle physics, not to off themselves. They could change fields and live on.
if objects you put on a table started falling through the floor it would be a bit stressful
lol
but Dr. Becky gets really excited about all the various "crisis in cosmology" because she knows new science/knowledge will emerge from solving those questions
and you remind me there's another season coming up in that series, can't wait
"Is he still in the grandmother’s house? We would like to speak to him."
It's good for the world but terrible for the practitioners in academia. Imagine you are in your last year of your PhD and then something new comes out and completely invalidates/obsoletes your results. Cough natural language processing PhDs during COVID when GPT-3 came around..
Academic here. It's actually great for us. You're usually the first to see the implications for your niche area and have a chance to get a hot paper out rather than a moderately impactful one.
I think it depends on who has the hot paper and who has the outdated results. I was in academia for quite some time and when sometime cool comes out that renders other results less important, there are always winners and losers beccause the only thing that matters in academia is impact and the latest and greatest - not the blind alleys along the way.
There isn't really an "us" in academia like there is in a private company, who all have a common goal: in academia the goal is to get there before another does and be on top.
im pretty sure in private companies people are vying for promotions and trying to out maneuver their colleagues in the eyes of management. just look at ai use, johnny knows how to prompt better than sammy, so johnny looks like a 2x more productive programmer. its every man, woman and child for themselves.
The perspective changes if you're in your last year of PhD as GP said. I'm sure the system is built in a way that you'll still graduate because your supervisor knows this is about learning how to conduct research and not about being right. But it's likely still soul crushing to come out with no published paper (unless you still publish knowing you're wrong, which in some cases might be valuable).
If your soul can bounce back, finding ways your previous research might help, or combine with the breakthrough (or not !) can help. I've used many previous formal/analytic SOTA algorithms and methods for dataset tagging automation, or as feedback for RL, or to speed-up post-training.
Three/four years of (honest) work is usually worth to publish.
The result might not be high impact (and thus end up in a lower tier journal, sadly) but knowing what didn't work is also a valid output.
PHDs will spend years mastering some intricate multi-day long procedure to do some thing and a new discovery will obviate the need for the procedure completely.
Preach. The way out is to find truly basic problems that you’re attacking at a fundamental level.
That rarely gets funded. And even more rarely handed off to grad students. In a sense the failure of a bunch of grad students is priced in to the way science is done.
Which makes it so perverse their lives and careers depend on success as newcomers.
This is false, not his research dissertation at all, ... during his student years he did consider the design of a luminiferous ether experiment that he then believed would differentiate an ether world vs a non-ether world.
Of course his views (and most everyone elses) evolved when Lorentz derived the Lorentz transform on grounds of a physical argument, and pointed out that Maxwell's Equations were maintained their form after such a coordinate transform, in gravity-free universes (simple linearly related inertial systems).
When Einstein developed his special theory of relativity, he rejected the putative measurability of the ether in flat spacetime metrics.
Because the ether does exist, when considering the wider world of non-flat spacetime metrics.
You could say Michelson-Morley compared 2 horizontal axes (which are rotation symmetric with the gravity vector). Variations of predictable ether effects are perfectly measurable, when comparing horizontal with vertical paths!
Celebrating the mistakes is, as you're saying, perhaps a bit too far. But mistakes will happen, it's just the nature of the world. That makes developing a robust error correction mentality something that genuinely is worth celebrating.
No one celebrates the mistakes ... what an absurd strawman (qsera's). Rather we celebrate the scientific method that finds and corrects mistakes, as you say.
This is a ridiculous strawman argument that misconstrues what people are saying is good about science--that it constantly reexamines and improves upon its models. You're saying that it would be preferable to have an oracle that flawlessly tells us the truth, and therefore the fallibility of science is "a weakness of the process", but that's completely absurd, a radical failure of reasoning, as of course no such oracle is possible. Given the inherent limitations of finding empirical facts, and empirical generalizations that only hold because we live in a lawful universe (so far, and everywhere we've looked--it is of course logically possible for it to be otherwise, as Hume noted), science is a very effective and powerful method, the best method conceived.
I won't engage further with such bad reasoning and arguments that verge on bad faith.
1. "Science" can only correct when economics allows it to do so.
2. True believers of science who are ever apologetic to the problems with contemporary scientific method provides economic incentives, and prevent real science to happen.
Hence my irritation with the "Celebration" when ever science makes a mistakes (an apologetic gesture to stop the loss of "faith" in science), because that is the unmistaken mark of a "True believer".
Out of my depth really, but I believe the "data driven" approach probably refers to some sort of renormalization.
What renormalization does is your theory produces all sort of infinities but you know there is mechanism that eliminates them but your theory is not able to calculate how that happens and the exact degree so you go out look at real numbers and then tweak your model to predict the correct values .
I may be glossing over misrepresenting stuff but that is the gist of it I think. As far as I understand physists don't love this, Feynman and company had reservations (not objections mid you), but it works and allows you to do additional useful work.
The data-driven approach is referring to a more general technique --- it's a less fancy concept than renormalization, which only comes up when doing full-blown relativistic quantum field theory. Specifically, it refers to the use of a couple of well-grounded mathematical tricks to sidestep doing a from-first-principles calculation by, effectively, translating the results of different measurements into a prediction for something new (in this case, a quantity that contributes to the calculation of the magnetic moment).
In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, there is the concept of the "wavefunction," from which you can predict the results of measurements of a particle/system. But in most real-world scenarios, you can't actually compute the wavefunction, and so naively you can't make any predictions. But there is something called the "optical theorem," which relates a single evaluation of the wavefunction to a scattering cross-section, which is something that can be measured. If you're familiar with complex analysis, there is also the "residue theorem" which allows you relate individual function values with integrals of the function in the complex plane. Basically, you can combine those two relations to translate kind one integral (which you need to compute) into a different integral (which can be measured).
This is what was done here --- just instead of a simple QM wavefunction, the relevant concept is called a "vacuum polarization function."
I think it describes the methods needed to obtain and process a large amount of data in a field where getting a small amount of data is expensive and requires incredible hardware.
The framing that there is some unknown particle affecting the results is probably an understatement. Probably there are a LOT of unknown 'forces' affecting the results. Look at the size of the machine, the aging components, the number of components involved, the amount of software required, surely all of that is affecting the results.
Are humans even capable of building perfectly reliable systems?
You would probably be very surprised about just how much work is put in to characterizing these things. My graduate work was on another experiment (though our postdoc worked on one of the earlier g−2 experiments mentioned here!), but we literally had man-years of work sunk into measuring one thing about the experiment, one number, as accurately as possible and with valid error bars.
That was not the only thing about the apparatus, just one of the most important, but the point is: we cared, we cared a lot, and we cared a lot about a lot of things.
Sure, but you can only solve a problem that you are aware of. My concern here is about the unknown unknowns. The task at hand is exceedingly complex and requires extreme precision, with many unknown variables... And the people solving the problems have conflicting interests as they are paid hourly.
Even if there are bonuses, all the bonuses would be given on the basis of solving known problems. There is literally zero monetary incentive to solve unknown problems; only owners care about that stuff. Employees don't care about that. They might point out some whilst not mentioning others.
I've been a software engineer for 15 years and my experience is that unknown unknowns in tech are like a secret piggy bank for engineers to tap into in times of need. They are rarely brought up; only in the event that an engineer feels the need to justify their value to the company/project. The accumulation of secrets gives engineers differentiable value within the project/company and makes them hard to replace... So they tend to keep at least a couple to themselves... They ration it; like retirement planning.
The individual incentive to conceal issues until a time of personal need (when layoffs are looming) outweighs the collective incentive to identify new issues to generate more billable hours of work for the team.
If you're the only person who knows the issue which prevents a multi-million dollar project from coming to fruition, that is valuable information and gives you a lot of leverage in terms of job security... Which is the biggest reward you can get in this line of work.
And it's not malicious; the people who know about those issues probably also solve more issues and contribute more solutions than anyone else. The concealment may be happening subconsciously; they won't admit to themselves that a specific kind of problem exists.
Like when I worked in crypto, all the engineers there believed that the project could scale and also be decentralized... When it couldn't, given the chosen approach. The belief is still there years later; though all the rational engineers left, they were promptly replaced by believers.
Precision results are usually blinded, so it's not as if scientists can just rejigger the calculation if it's giving an implausible result; once the result has been unblinded, the calculation is finished. The physicists working on these experiments are therefore extremely motivated to quantify all potentially non-negligible sources of systemic error beforehand.
That said, the issue in this case is almost certainly systemic, not new physics. But I don't think you should consider the misfortune of the data-driven calculation typical; rather, it's notable specifically because of the discrepancies. Most calculations do not have such large disagreements. The lattice results, in contrast to those from the data-driven approach, all line up very nicely.
To be fair, sometimes the blinding is a piece of duct tape over the display on a piece of fancy OTS industrial equipment. Though we needed to poke at it occasionally, so we needed a duct tape flap we could lift up every now and then rather than just a bare piece. I forget if I made ours or if C made it, but I remember our little blinding flap fondly.
Bluntly, I think this just highlights why software engineering is not a serious engineering discipline. There are some exceptions, like safety-critical systems, but on the whole, software is not designed and developed with a rigor comparable to physical sciences.
Especially true now with AI coding. But I would push back on the idea that sciences or other engineering disciplines are not affected. Several of the people I met who were especially guilty of this in software sector had a PhD in mathematics and used to work in academic institutions.
I think intellectual integrity has been on the decline overall.
> the people solving the problems have conflicting interests as they are paid hourly
LOL. No, no they are not. There's a lot of reasons I'm out of that game, and this is one of them. $1400 a month (2010 dollars), unlimited working hours, unlimited international travel. Sound fun? No?
> bonuses
I think I got a $5 Starbucks gift card once. I guess you could count the free leftover pizza as a "bonus"?
To address the heart of your argument, Science is not structured like software engineering, and if you're thinking it is, you're making a lot of mistakes. Scientists often do well as software engineers, should they change careers [waves hand!]; economics aside, software engineers very rarely make good scientists. The mentality is simply different.
As regards complexity management and dishonesty; yes, straight-up dishonesty does occur sometimes. We are all human, after all. But science is done in the physical world, and unlike software or mathematics, the physical world does not admit unlimited complexity. So things must be divided up in a manageable way right from the very beginning. On a big experiment, if your little "box" of responsibility does not work, you can and will be replaced. I have seen it done. Even to or by me. (If involved, I have historically been the one doing the replacing; but I've been on the other end, too.) And you will be cross-checked by independent people, if it is critical: I have seen this too. You had better get it right.
My gut reaction is that the probable cause of the discrepancy is ultimately "someone calculated something wrong." It's not like particle physics experiments actually generate something directly measurable like the muon's magnetic moment; you instead get an indirect result that you have to calculate to the value you're trying to measure. And half of the constants in that calculation are themselves from reported results in other experiments, which similarly returned indirect results that are dependent on correct results from other experiments... and it's not hard to imagine that the result of "value X is A" depends on an assumption that "value X is B" somewhere in the calculation tree.
I really dislike the writing style of being so "friendly" for people who don't know anything about the space that you obscure what the topic of the article is at all.
It's a third of the way through the article when "g-2", the problem at hand, is mentioned. Information that should have been shared in the title took a third of the article to figure out.
I dont particularly agree with this article, but there have been quanta articles i've read in the past that went so far trying to make the topic accessible that it became incomprehensible. Where they used so many metaphors and simplifications that it lost all meaning.
Science writing for a general audience is really challenging.
If you're writing an article about a man going to the store to buy a sandwich, the man, the store, and the sandwich should all make appearances by the end of the first paragraph.
These people are writing informative articles like novels and it's incredibly irritating and a disservice if you're actually trying to inform anybody about anything. If you're writing an article about the g-2 anomaly, "g-2 anomaly" belongs in the title not 1/3 the way in.
> I really dislike the writing style of being so "friendly" for people who don't know anything about the space that you obscure what the topic of the article is at all.
Someone who writes a sentence like that is in no position to comment on writing style.
Yep. This would backfire spectacularly for people just want to know what's going on. They would just dump the article in the llm and ask, 'what problem is this article about'
If old results do not add up then I can see two immediate reasons:
- The new results are wrong. That's why there is a difference.
- The old results were wrong. In this case all involved scientists should be very much ashamed to have helpfully participated in worshipping wrongness and fakery.
A third option could be partial wrongness, but I group this into the second case. In the modern era I no longer buy into honesty of scientists at all times. Case in point: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1197258 - bacterium growing via arsenic. Totally fabricated, hence lateron "retracted" (originally published in 2010).
Hmm... The Reality changed itself when guys in Siberia changed the sensor? Some years ago I was playing with the idea that the Reality might invent new laws when people look for them, and doesn't bother with laws when no one observes them. It would be in the style of Copenhagen interpretation, though even with regard to it, the idea seems too weird to be true. But now we have an experimental evidence.
In any case it gives me ideas how to check the hypothesis. If the Reality has a limited horizon for planning for new laws, scientists can trick it into inventing new laws that eventually (after some more research and even more laws observed) would start contradicting to each other, and at that point the Reality would snap into a different set of rules.
If it is true, then the plan is like this: we need to wipe all the scientific knowledge from this world and start again, and trick the the Reality into devising better laws of nature. Ah, wait, we have no evidence that the Reality can abandon laws that were introduced already. Pity, the plan is brilliant, but how to check if the Reality can abandon its laws? If laws are local... we can do something like Stephenson described in his Anathem: establish maths doing independent research and comparing their results once in 1000 years.
> Some years ago I was playing with the idea that the Reality might invent new laws when people look for them, and doesn't bother with laws when no one observes them
There are several books from Greg Egan with this idea in mind: Permutation City and Distress. The latter one is exactly about this idea.
I love how the closer we get to “the edge of the Reality”, the more it sounds like the ramblings of someone that got their hands on some of that GOOD stuff
You might want to read Dan Simmons' Ilium and if you can stomach some weird post-9/11 shit, Olympos. One of the overarching themes is what you describe... or similar.