|
|
|
|
|
by seanhunter
17 hours ago
|
|
I understand the point about density and I'm fine with the concept of functions being continuous over a restricted domain (eg the rationals even) but if I draw a line and label one end 0 and one end 1 then I have plotted the set of all numbers in that interval, not just the ones we find computationally convenient. The historical context about the constructivist movement is that it was a religiously-inspired objection to the work of Cantor, who some random bishop said was challenging God with his work on transfinite numbers because God owned infinity. I just find it weird that now people try to pretend that it's somehow more rigorous when really it's just an alternative axiomatic perspective that started in this shonky way and has grown to a point where it's just about respectable. |
|
The problem to me is that the Reals which aren't computable are absurd. We've never used any of them in all history. We can only put names on a very special few, those are countable, and we don't even know their value very well.
And the main way we prove that the Reals are uncountable is to use a proof by contradiction. It would take too long to spell it out, but they aren't really just contradicting "Reals are Countable". It's "All that other stuff we think is true AND Reals are Countable" that gets contradicted.
Once you accept the Reals, the Axiom of Choice is not simply obvious any more. And if you go down that path you get things like the Banach-Tarski paradox. To me THAT ought to be a proof by contradiction that we've made a mistake somewhere.
More interesting than that though: If the universe we live in requires non-computable Reals to describe it carefully, then it says something very weird about determinism. In order to compute a future state of a system, we need to use numbers we can't compute?!?