[microtonal]

citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted.

Also worth mentioning that you can set auto-reboot to a shorter period (down to 10 minutes). So if you anticipate situations where your phone can be seized (border crossings, demonstrations), it's worth temporarily setting this to a short time period (or rebooting your phone yourself to get to BFU).

[msh]

I dont understand why people like a journalist working on things they dont want seized would carry this kind of data on their device at a situation like this (border crossing), I see it as more useful to remove that kind of data from the device first.

[dugite-code]

Probably because everything seems to be an "app" these days. Even when it has no business being one.

[inigyou]

Exactly. Everything must be switched to Service as a Software Substitute. It's for your own safety, you see.

[xnickb]

So delete messengers, email apps and other comms?

Delete the contact book? Clear calendars?

Where exactly should one stop?

[daneel_w]

You're misinterpreting. They mean that there are additional options next to only keeping these things on your phone.

[xnickb]

What am I misinterpreting? OP literally said they don't understand why a journalist would carry these data with them. As if the data is a file on your phone. Data can be a contact book on your phone, or a messenger with E2E encrypted messages. What would the alternative to that be? Sending pigeons?

[iamnothere]

Restoring from remote backup when you reach your destination, then wiping again before you cross borders. Or shipping the (encrypted) data separately and picking it up after safe arrival.

[xnickb]

What's the difference between this and wiping when under duress using the special PIN? If you aren't being checked you don't wipe and are gopd to go.

[inigyou]

The government can easily get your remote backup, of course. It's just that border control won't know you have one.

[choo-t]

Because you may need the data in the data during/after your travel and lack clean way to access safely, securely and anonymously remotely.

[daneel_w]

No one is stopped from backing up important data. It is, in fact, kind of boneheaded to keep all "valuables" on a single device. I don't understand the scenario of not trusting a device to safely access the Internet or the telephony grid while also insisting that they need a PHONE to keep all their stuff on where they're going, and at the same time somehow trust that both themselves and their possessions are perfectly safe from seizure and extortion in the very same location.

[inigyou]

Personally I just got grapheneos to replace my normal phone. It's nice, it works for the user instead of the advertiser, and its security features help block antiuser features in apps

[daneel_w]

I personally run iOS but have given GrapheneOS an extended run on a development phone I use for work, and I have to say it really is a much tidier, less distracting, smoother and more responsive experience than any other Android setup I've used before.

[kotaKat]

This is where we need "cloud phones as a service" / "selfhosting a cellphone at home with some kind of remote access system".

Not even kidding here, it's time to bring out thin client computing to cellphones. Let the spicy stuff sit somewhere else. I could bootstrap a Tailscale or Netbird signin remotely, install the access client, and remote back into the 'normal phone'.

Would be then funny to map that to lockscreen PINs - enter a PIN to unlock the device, be remoted into "phone A", enter another pin and be remoted into "phone B", enter another PIN and you're on the 'local device' session. (Or duress-PIN kill "phone A" if someone attempts to bruteforce PINs, etc, etc...)

[drnick1]

You can already do most of that with GrapheneOS or even an iPhone. My contacts, files, photos, etc. are on my home server, accessed through a VPN. My GrapheneOS phone only runs a handful of open source apps. If I were to lose the phone, I would simply revoke the Wireguard key and there wouldn't be anything valuable left on it.

[mystifyingpoi]

> "selfhosting a cellphone at home with some kind of remote access system

You can use TeamViewer for that. Or maybe scrcpy could be coerced into working in a similar way.

[prmoustache]

Good luck making it work again remotely after a long power outage.

[mystifyingpoi]

Not sure what do you mean? If that is a concern, there are solutions for this. Like UPSes and backup cellular connections.

[like_any_other]

Remove and securely overwrite, otherwise the data can still be recovered from the disk image. We have not made privacy easy.

[podocarp]

What about using decoy profiles? Say before the border crossing you switch to another user. Does that expose keys or anything for other users?

[0-_-0]

You would need to hide the existence of the original profile while in the decoy profile for this to work, which GrapheneOS considers too complex to implement

[inigyou]

The only really plausibly deniable way to do it is for every graphene phone to come pre-partitioned for this. E.g. 128GB main + 128GB duress, random selection of whether partition 0 or 1 is the duress partition. But that means giving up half your storage.

You can't even make them different sizes because that gives away which one is duress. You could have more partitions with a static split like 32+32+32+32+32+32+32+32 but then you have to manage so many independent partitions it isn't practical.

[kmeisthax]

Deniable encryption has gotten way more advanced than this, though - the state-of-the-art is to have a bunch of independently unlockable data stores along with a mechanism to add chaff data that doesn't decrypt with any key. That's how bunnie's Betrusted project works, and it's the same idea as PhonebookFS from yesterdecade.

The main problem with any deniable encryption system is that while your adversary might not be able to prove if you gave them the decoy or real data, they can at least force you to wipe anything you fail to decrypt. In your partitioning scheme, that would mean wiping any partition that doesn't decrypt with the set of PINs you gave them. In the more advanced granular scheme that Betrusted devices use, that would mean border control unlocking all the basis keys you dared to give them, and then them running the storage reclaim tool that wipes all other keys.

In either case, it would probably be easier (and less suspicious!) to pre-wipe your device and then redownload a backup after you pass through border control... assuming you can get access to an untampered Internet connection after the fact, AND assuming your backup is actually complete. Like, I'm pretty sure most apps exclude their login tokens from backup, because every time I do wind up restoring a backup, I have to log into everything again, which makes me wonder what the point of the backup even is?

[inigyou]

That requires a whole new OS from scratch. It won't work to support Android. Even if it did, would you unlock your duress partition every time you used your phone to prevent overwriting?

[Cider9986]

I mean, so does everyone.

https://veracrypt.io/en/Wear-Leveling.html