[crote]

But "just recompute the FCS" isn't quite the right approach, is it?

With a traditional cut-through switch the entire packet is passed as-is, so you're not modifying a corrupt package. You don't drop it, but the corruption is trivially detectable on the other side. If you naively recompute the FCS on transmit you essentially mark a corrupted package as valid, so you have to compute the FCS on transmit and receive, and intentionally send out the wrong FCS on transmit if you determine the receive FCS is invalid.

[userbinator]

so you have to compute the FCS on transmit and receive, and intentionally send out the wrong FCS on transmit if you determine the receive FCS is invalid.

Yes, exactly; but that isn't particularly difficult either, compared to all the other packet-editing capabilities that switch ASICs have.

[bcrl]

It's easy enough to write a bit of Verilog to perform partial updates on the CRC to only compensate for what has changed. I did so for an FPGA project I implemented a number of years ago when processing VLAN tags and doing IP forwarding.

That said, there are lazy hardware designers that just slap on a block to recompute the CRC and replace the old one with the new. An experience I had years ago at Red Hat taught me that the hard way as a shiny new Cisco ethernet switch IT deployed ended up costing us weeks of frustration and delayed a release when it caused bit flips in NFS packets during stress testing. The switch was so awesomely advanced that it recomputed the CRC on the bit flipped packets causing kernel builds to fail. <sigh>

[foobiekr]

Wow that rings a bell.

The lack of end to end ECC protection in some packet paths on very high end ASICs is something I just can’t get over.

[bcrl]

ECC tends to be too expensive to be used widely in hardware data paths. Most of the time hardware will use a parity bit as checking it is far less costly (both in terms of gates and power). Parity bits are usually sufficient, as the purpose is really limited to identifying hardware failure. The CRC should prevent delivery of a corrupted packet provided the hardware doesn't cheat and blindly recompute it.