[jacobgold]

> These are not open proxies.

Okay, I was being imprecise. These residential proxies aren't "open proxies" in the traditional sense, but they're usually "open" to anyone willing to pay a small amount of money to use them.

> Most ISP abuse reports are routinely ignored. They might as well be a dead letter box.

This is where regulation might play a role, or at least a change in attitude. Companies shouldn't be allowed to pollute the internet in this way when they can easily prevent it.

[pudgywalsh]

Ok but these proxies almost certainly reverse-tunnel. How do you prove a customer is hosting one?

Unless you are doing GFW China-level traffic analysis against a blacklist, which again how do you prove?

[jacobgold]

> Ok but these proxies almost certainly reverse-tunnel. How do you prove a customer is hosting one?

Why do you think that? These are proxies, so they're making huge numbers of outbound connections to websites on behalf of the people operating them. They are the "exit nodes" in this setup.

You could probably just count the number of unique destination IPs they connect to each day. If the average residential user connects to 5,000, an infected machine is probably connecting to 50,000+.

But the simplest approach is to buy access to these illicit proxy services and use them to make requests to web servers you control. If you see your own unique request arrive from a residential IP, you've proven that connection is being used as a proxy.

[inigyou]

So your plan is for the government to shut off the internet of anyone who connects to 50000 different IP addresses in a day?