Ironically Hugging Face had to use a Chinese model to stop a Rogue US AI, since the Guard Rails prevented them from using Sol or Fable to remediate this attack. LOL
Quote: “When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker. We ran the forensic analysis instead on GLM 5.2, an open-weight model, on our own infrastructure. This had a second benefit: no attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment.”
> This had a second benefit: no attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment.”
Well, not none of it, to be entirely nitpicky, as they've already must have sent data at first to have received the rejections :) In the end, it ended up being OpenAI's agent actions anyways so doesn't really matter, and the credentials it seems like the agent also had gotten to those too already. Still, I'm sure they'll look differently at hosted/restricted models after this event, as will many others.
Perhaps fortuitous timing for OpenAI that they can spin the fact that defenders have to resort to open Chinese models because OpenAI and Anthropic actively sabotage them with nerfed models into a nice message of making Huggingface part of the privileged group entitled to secure systems.
Another important part here. It's not as if they prompted the open source AI to stop the rogue AI but rather just used it as a tool to crawl logs and determine what happened.
OK, that's some interesting information but they used OpenAI without guard rails to pull off the attack so how did they do that? That's according to the article, so it kind of invalidates the point you're making.
Quote: “When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker. We ran the forensic analysis instead on GLM 5.2, an open-weight model, on our own infrastructure. This had a second benefit: no attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment.”