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by utilize1808 8 days ago
They can just favour some specific versions of some library that's been compromised. Unlike introducing bugs / flaws directly in the source code, they can claim plausible deniability, and it's much easier to implement without compromising the general coding capabilities of the models.
2 comments

I'm talking about using mechanistic interpretability to see the model's intent. If it is deliberately using compromised libraries to weaken some code's security, there's going to be a signal in its hidden activations that it's doing so.

Finding these kinds of activations is something Anthropic is actively researching [1] but they're the only ones who can use those techniques to see Claude's intent. On the other hand, if a model is open-weights, in theory whoever is running the model could look inside the activations at runtime to see if a hidden vector associated with "deception" or "sabotage" is being activated [2].

[1] https://transformer-circuits.pub/ [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.03518

(Those sources are just a couple of relevant starting points I could find without much effort, there is also https://www.neuronpedia.org/ if one is interested in seeing interactive demonstrations of interpretability concepts)

Except that the model doesn't hold any malicious intent when doing it. No "deception", no "sabotage".
Not sure I understand that position. Unless we're talking about a scenario in which one is using an outdated model along with no grounding (which, imo, PEBKAC), why would the model be pinning insecure libraries?

If it does have grounding, and can therefore see that it's introducing vulnerabilities to the code it's generating, yet does so anyway... I suppose we could invoke Hanlon's razor, but if the model is that incompetent, it probably isn't the right tool for the job regardless of its provenance.

That said, we aren't talking about incompetent models, we're talking about models sabotaging projects due to hidden motives. My point, again, is that those motives could potentially be revealed with open-weight models, in a way that will never be possible with closed models (barring some sort of legislation requiring independent third-party interpretability audits, which I suppose is in the realm of possibility).

The model is conditioned / pretrained to use a particular version of a library. The model doesn’t know why — it was just taught to use that version. To the model, it is just some insignificant detail in the grand scheme of things. It’s just like how a model would intuitively favour using English without explicit instructions — it’s not trying to sabotage other cultures, it’s just what it does.
But that would happen with literally any model without grounding and is more of a quality/competence issue, not what's being discussed. It'd be a bit of stretch to conclude open models are no more auditable than closed models based on that possibility alone.

Also, in that case, there would likely be activations indicating that it is favoring a specific version. If that's an insecure version, sure that'd be suspicious... but again, you're only going to be able to verify that's what's happening in an open model.

Maybe you can illustrate a realistic scenario in which that would be a problem, otherwise I don't really understand what your point is in this context.

> Also, in that case, there would likely be activations indicating that it is favoring a specific version.

> Maybe you can illustrate a realistic scenario in which that would be a problem, otherwise I don't really understand what your point is in this context.

I doubt it. Can you definitively prove that you can reliably detect the kind of threat I described when model weights are released? Can you be sure that your detector won't miss *any* such sleeper attacks? If not, then that's a threat that will be used to justify the ban of models (open or not) that is not sanctioned by the US government. A model being open doesn't make a difference here.

Cannot non-Chinese closed weights model do the same?
It will be used as ammunitions against non-US sanctioned models in general.
Obviously. But that is missing the point of the conversation. It was suggested that open models offer a security advantage which it seems is not the case.