[chipweinberger]

I'm using an STSAFE chip - the same IC they use in StarLink terminals. Essentially the digital equivalent of a holographic barcode. I have some other protections too. e.g. Random 128-bit per-device IDs / product-keys. iMessage uses this strategy.

Maybe I'll write an article about that.

[rustyhancock]

Sounds like that'll be a great read.

This is (literally) none of my business, but would you consider a cut down or basic open source version (hardware and software, with open software running in the proper hardware). Yes it'll be cloned by factories, and yes it will cut into sales no matter what proponents claim. (And yes it's probably more work than I imagine it is).

But also yes, it'll be genuine open hardware and might out live your interest in the project.

[c0nsumer]

Reading your comment it sounds like you're asking the author to do more work to potentially/likely undercut their own sales. They are already offering a quality device at a reasonable price without any untoward restrictions.

If you want a Free work-alike, why don't /you/ put in the work and make it happen?

[stavros]

Please do, that'd be very interesting. I imagine it's doable to use random per-device I'd when you're hand-flashing, but probably harder on a huge production run.

[swiftcoder]

Almost all commercial devices need a unique ID, private key, etc burned in on the production line. For a big enough production run, you'd likely ship an HSM to the factory

[chipweinberger]

IMO it's better to ship preprogrammed ICs to the factory, so you can do your secure burning in-house.

[swiftcoder]

Depends on where the ICs originally come from. No point shipping your ICs from China -> US, flashing them, shipping them back US -> China for assembly, and then ship them China -> US again to sell

[Teknomadix]

Yet people do this all the time. Ask me how I know.

[thenthenthen]

Can reply to the reply below but yeah, i have done that, lol

[Hackbraten]

> For a big enough production run, you'd likely ship an HSM to the factory

I figure that the factory is exactly the adversary in the whole threat model? So why give them the keys to the castle so they can moonlight their own genuine batch?

[NBJack]

A few ways, if I understand them correctly. On-site people you employ (if you can afford it) auditing the process, connectivity to the HSM to record every key assigned (makes it easy to trace duplicated keys to their origin), and ideally assigning these keys at the very last possible step after the rest is assembled (to minimize 'defective' parts wandering off and being assembled elsewhere).

[swiftcoder]

Yeah, it's important that your own people are doing regular inspections of the production line, keys get burned at the final station (use temp keys for QA stages before that point), and you retain software control of the HSM.

You probably aren't going to do this whole rigmarole for small runs of devices like in the OP.

[chrismorgan]

> Almost all commercial devices need a unique ID, private key, etc

Serious question: why?

[swiftcoder]

You want a unique ID so that you can track which units are experiencing issues, you want private keys to be able to securely connect to your backend service and/or mobile companion app.

A local-only device with no telemetry can probably skip some of those

[amelius]

How do you verify the ID? In the software? What if the software is hacked? I'm curious how this can be safe.

[_fw]

Please do! Trying to imagine how this works.

[Teknomadix]

Yes, please do!

[DANmode]

Please!