[greyface-]

RPKI addresses both.

Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) enforce which ASes are allowed to originate a prefix. ROAs address origin hijacks, and have been around for longer.

Autonomous System Provider Authorizations (ASPAs) enforce which ASes are allowed to be adjacent to each other in an AS_PATH. ASPAs address path hijacks, and were introduced more recently. It used to be that you had to self-host (as in the article) in order to publish ASPAs, but RIRs are now starting to support them on their hosted RPKI offerings. I'm surprised the article didn't mention this as a reason to run your own RPKI.

If the first hop publishes a ROA, and all subsequent hops publish an ASPA, then the full path can be validated.

[jcgl]

What's the history and status of ASPA? As far as I can see, it's a fairly active draft with the IETF: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-ver...

It says it's on the standards track, but it's clearly quite new. How well has it been proven out? This page from Hurricane Electric shows <3% adoption: https://bgp.he.net/report/rpki_and_aspa

[greyface-]

It's still very early. RIPE and ARIN have only supported publishing them for a few months. ARIN made very little noise about it during the rollout, and many networks are probably still unaware. Give it a couple years, and I expect we'll see fairly good adoption among those already publishing ROAs. There will still be the never-RPKI holdouts, however.

HE publishes their full ASPA table here, if you're interested in digging in: https://routing.he.net/?cmd=display_aspa_table

[zajio1am]

Also note that ASPA validation prevents only hijack by peers and customers, not by providers. Due to way how ASPA validation works, providers could always announce to their customers routes with valid-looking AS PATH with hijacked ASN appended at its end.

[tialaramex]

Trust infrastructures are always like this, it's one reason PGP's "Web of trust" doesn't work at scale.

If you trust Alice then it's not astonishing that Alice can stab you in the back. Most of us can probably manage to pick trustworthy direct friends. But then, what if we're to trust that Alice's friends won't betray us ? That's a lot stickier.

PGP tries to distinguish "Do you trust that Alice is who she says she is?" from "Do you trust that Alice is a good judge of character?" but the latter is largely unknowable and PGP treats it as recursive. You trust Alice, Alice trusted Bob, Bob trusted Caroline and now Caroline's friend Dave stabbed you in the back. How is this Alice's fault somehow?

[somat]

How is that better or worse than the "I trust everyone my authority trusts" mechanism the authority system uses?

[tialaramex]

Having a handful of authorities means we can direct our limited resources at scrutinizing those authorities. Which we do, to great effect. It's not perfect, such a system will never be perfect, but it keeps improving. It's a lot better in 2026 than it was in 2016, and it was a lot better in 2016 than in 2006. In 1996 this is all new and the CAs have basically no idea what they're doing, what's a domain name? Their employees aren't using Tim's toy hypermedia service, it's for nerds.

The resources available to check that Edith's friend Frank's cousin Gerald is trustworthy are zero and when trusting Gerald goes badly, what do we do? "Oh, huh, be more careful"? It's not actionable at all.

[zajio1am]

Note that the first hop has to publish both ROA and ASPA records, as ASPA records describes a set of valid providers.

[ipdashc]

That makes sense, thanks!