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by mburney
4934 days ago
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Many philosophers have questioned the scientific definition of "correctness". For example Heidegger who argued that scientific truth is an approximation and measurement of things that we already presume to exist. These discoveries may be correct, and they may be true. But what about the more primordial truth (i.e. being) which we take for granted before we even begin a scientific inquiry? This is what he investigates, so pretty much all scientific definitions of correctness don't apply here. But it is very hard to convince followers of scientism that this investigation has any meaning, because they've already closed their minds to this form of thinking. |
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This concisely and aptly summarizes the reason for philosophy's low standing among intellectual disciplines.
Philosophers are manifestly unqualified to debate the scientific definition of anything, much less "correctness". Beyond this, a suitable definition is too short to be of interest to a philosopher, someone for whom the number of words uttered is always ranked higher than the intellectual content of each word taken separately.
A scientific idea is "correct" if it can be successfully compared to reality.
How hard is that? I hasten to add that no scientific idea ever becomes true for all time -- all such ideas are subject to falsification by new evidence, by new comparisons to reality.
> But it is very hard to convince followers of scientism...
Ah, yes, the "science is just another religion" gambit. It speaks volumes about the depth of modern philosophical thought.
Philosophers compare their ideas to those of other philosophers. Scientists compare their ideas to reality.