Seems to me a tool like that would stop the agent from sending those specific keys elsewhere. But a tool like that would not stop the agent who is acting as you from using the SSH keys via the CLI. You would want to combine that with other tactics like having the agent run as some other user.
Secretive (and the similar built-in functionality [1]) both allow you to require TouchID too. I found an okay balance using two SSH keys: one for commit signing (w/o TouchID) and one for everything else (requires TouchID, or PIN on Linux)
So, the actions that I really don't want the agent to take (establishing an SSH connection, pushing to a git remote) always require my manual intervention.
Yeah. The agent can create commits and those commits are signed (`commit.gpgsign true`).
I'm treating it like...you can hold me accountable for that commit and the commit came from my computer. That feels like the right spirit of things.
How do you do commit signing? I've never worked anywhere it was common, nor worked on a team where anyone else signed commits. I don't know how it's really used in the wild, so to speak.
> I don't know how it's really used in the wild, so to speak.
Commit signing primarily exists because linux kernel development happens via email, which isn't a secure channel.
In that context, signing is used to prove provenance; a commit signed by someone with merge rights gets included, and if you repeatedly sign bad code you'll have your right to merge revoked.
> you can hold me accountable for that commit
I wouldn't personally want to be held accountable for a commit I'd never so much as read, so I would never sign (even locally) a commit until I'd looked at it.