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by Veserv
20 days ago
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Yes, you do enjoy evading the argument. You continuously point at implementation and operational model differences as proof that virtualization is the key factor. Theo's argument is literally that virtualization versus non-virtualization is irrelevant compared to implementation and operational model deficiencys. If you make garbage implementations and operational models, then you get garbage virtualization. If you have a good implementation and operational model then you do not need virtualization for "security". As independent evidence for this point, virtualization is not the basis of security/isolation in seL4. You have isolation without any virtual machines. Virtual machines are just a feature on top that can leverage the existing isolation functionality to also provide isolated virtual machines. Of course, a secure deployment then requires you to leverage this foundation with a good operational model and system design since you can always make a insecure system even atop a good foundation. This demonstrates that virtualization is not necessary for a secure base, nor sufficient to achieve highly secure systems. Just to hammer in the point that you are heavily misinterpreting Theo's response, this is the full sentence at the start of the post that Theo was responding to: "Virtualization seems to have a lot of security benefits. Rootkits can lie to DomU but not Dom0, and of course snapshotting, migration etc is really nice." Wow, amazing, rootkits can never be in Dom0 because Xen has "virtualization" magic pixie dust. Theo is pointing out how this is nonsense and virtualization will only provide security if you can create implementations without glaring security holes. Furthermore, you should not just listen to the people who brought you insecure system 1 when they tell you that this time for sure they are going to give you secure system 2; maybe have just a little bit of cynicism and ask for some evidence first. |
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