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by StrauXX
18 days ago
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localStorage is very much fine and arguably superior to cookies for authentication tokens. First of all, once you have achieved JS execution on a target origin, you can send requests, open up malicious "login" prompts and generally control everything the user sees and does. The article mentions this, but plays it down with no good arguments. Much more importantly however, is that the cookie standards are a mess! The complexity of cookie default behaviour, their flags, scopes, differences in their SOP (cookies ignore ports for example, so https://example.com:443 and https://example.com:8443 share their cookies) are huge. Research papers have been written in this. And don't even get started on differentials between browsing engines. This huge complexity of cookies opens up a whole class of authentication attacks where bad (or just weirdly) configured cookies can be stolen cross origin. localStorage on the other hand is practically impossible to get wrong. |
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But they're still the superior choice for authN on the web, because if you want to, you CAN configure cookies to be secure. Yes, attackers can ride the session, but it's dependent on the user being on the tab and you being able to consistently execute JS. Client-side compromise (ie attacker controls the entire browser) is not feasible to defend against anyway.
The main issue with JWT+localStorage is you can actually execute one-off JS, exfiltrate the token and come back later. I've _never_ seen a well-executed JWT+localStorage implementation in 10 or so years, because teams inevitably realise they can't reliably revoke sessions (another advantage of cookies) and then start giving out long-lived access tokens but adding them to the database. Or some variation of that.