[lelanthran]

> Partially, you could still deploy the AI in an isolated envirnoment. If there's nothing to access, there's no prompt injection.

If there's nothing to access, there's only limited value in using an LLM in the first place.

If your LLM is prevented from accessing anything other than the prompt, the only use is interactive use by the user; no automatic work done on any workflow items.

[siws]

Honest question: couldn't this be solved by setting the authorization level of the agent the same as the user that prompted the question?

In this post's example, the agent would be limited by the author's scope inside the organization and, therefore, be incapable of exposing any unwanted file.

[lelanthran]

> Honest question: couldn't this be solved by setting the authorization level of the agent the same as the user that prompted the question?

No.

> In this post's example, the agent would be limited by the author's scope inside the organization and, therefore, be incapable of exposing any unwanted file.

That still allows prompt injection to exfiltrate the authors files. That's the whole exploit - files that the author has, that he doesn't want exfiltrated.

[codethief]

As the sibling already said, this doesn't work/help in most cases. See https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ for a different explanation of the issue.