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by simonask
22 days ago
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> I think there were enough attacks already for cargo that one can not call this FUD. What attacks are you referring to specifically? > It is also obvious that this way to distribute software is susceptible to supply chain attacks. cargo audit is an attempt to fix this retrospectively, but does not fix this fundamentally broken model. This is the FUD I'm talking about. If you worry about supply chain attacks, it's not harder to be careful just because dealing with dependencies in general is much easier. You have to vet your dependencies no matter what. > The Linux distribution model worked perfectly fine for the 30 years I am using Linux. The xz scandal was a damn close call. Linux is a forest of distributions, and each distribution is a separate vulnerable organization. |
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It is not FUD as it is a real risk. cargo audit can only search for known issues, as such is like a virus scanner, often being too late. "You have to vet your dependencies no matter what" sounds nice, but Rust packages tend to pull in many hundreds of dependencies. But even for the comparable fewer dependencies in other languages, you can not usually vet everything yourself, you need to rely on the community to help. But then you need to have a curated software distribution, and this is exactly what traditional Linux distribution model does, while cargo does not.
xz scandal was a close call, but it was also a very sophisticated operation - which was then discovered by a Debian developer. This is not at all comparable to the cheap type squatting style attacks possible with cargo and confirms my point.